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Against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's three most re-
cent cases deciding the constitutionality of punitive damages,
Professors Rustad and Koenig examine the way partisan organi-
zations distort empirical social science research in amicus briefs.
They label this "junk social science" because the empirical find-
ings presented to the Justices have the aura of social science but
do not follow the scientific truth-seeking norms that regulate valid
research. Although the amicus briefs contained no outright
fabrications, Professors Rustad and Koenig find a pattern of
over-generalizations from limited social science data, selective
distortions of findings, normative statements that appear to be
empirical information, and citations to questionable research
specifically produced for litigation.
They conclude that amici curiae have been transformed from
":fiends of the court," whose role was to inform the Court of
overlooked precedent or facts, to "lobbyists of the Court. " The
politicization of amici briefs is disturbing because the Justices
have no suitable mechanism for independently assessing the va-
lidity of empirical research submitted for constitutional
fact-finding. To solve this problem, Professors Rustad and Koe-
nig propose several mechanisms: providing court-appointed so-
cial science experts and social science special masters;
increasing government funding for independent social science re-
search into contested claims; encouraging social science associa-
tions to file amici briefs that advocate neither side; and
expanding disclosure of the methodology and underlying data
cited in amicus briefs.
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"[E]x facto jus oritur."1
"[S]tatistics are not irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and,
like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their
usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and
circumstances."2
'There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics."3
I. NTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has used social science evidence for
many decades.4 Social science data is now routinely injected into the
Court's decision-making through litigant briefs, expert social scientific tes-
timony, Brandeis briefs,5 and judicial notice.6 The Court needs an effective
1. "The law arises out of the fact." HERBERT BRooME, A SELECTON OF LEGAL MAXIMS
102 (7th ed. 1874).
2. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977) (citation
omitted).
3. Mark Twain attributed this statement to Benjamin Disraeli. 1 MARK TwAJn's
AuTOBIOGRAPHY 246 (1924).
4. Three-quarters of a century have passed since an American court first invoked so-
cial science research to support its choice of a rule of law. Once heretical, the belief that
empirical studies can influence the content of legal doctrine is now one of the few points
of general agreement among jurists.
John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing So-
cial Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 477 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
5. The Brandeis brief was named after Justice Louis Brandeis who, as a young attorney,
assembled all of the extant social science research on the detrimental impact of long work hours
on the health of women. This was one of the first instances where an advocate emphasized the
law-in-action over the formalistic pronouncements of the law-in-the-books. See Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908). The term "Brandeis brief" has come to refer to any use of pol-
icy-oriented extra-legal arguments in briefs. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segre-
gation Before Brown, 1985 Duicn LJ. 624, 628 n.15. Frequently, constitutional litigators employ
the Brandeis brief to bring facts to the Court that do not appear in the record below. Some
scholars suggest that, until the 1950s, the Supreme Court largely ignored the Brandeis briefs that
were submitted. Id.
Kenneth Davis argues for an expanded role for Brandeis briefs. He would permit these de-
vices to bring in empirical research concerning the merits on changing a rule of law. Kenneth C.
Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REV.
364, 402-03 (1942). West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Richard Neeley also argues for a
greater use of Brandeis briefs in resolving complex policy issues, but he believes that few lawyers
have either the skill or the information necessary to prepare effective Brandeis briefs. RicHARD
NEEIEY, JUDIcAL JEoPARDY: WHEN Busu-ss Cor TwEs wrrH THE Cotmrs 1, 148-49 (1986).
6. The adversarial process provides a number of challenges to grossly inaccurate empirical
information. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REv.
1, 84 (1991); see also Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of
Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. R-v. 559, 592-98 (1987) (advocating the use of social science
experts in trial courts). See generally Monahan & Walker, supra note 4, at 498-512 (surveying the
judicial controls on the assessment of social research).
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way to determine whether the constitutional facts7 submitted as social sci-
ence findings are based on solid, empirical evidence.' In the absence of
such a mechanism, the Court is in danger of being misled by presentations
of social science findings that are distorted for partisan purposes. 9
The most common method of introducing social science evidence to
the Court is through "non-record evidence!"' in amicus curiae briefs."1 At
7. Professor David Faigman defines constitutional fact-finding as the study of "those facts
identified as being relevant either to the establishment of a constitutional rule or reviewable under
an established constitutional rule." David L. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding:
Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541,546
n.18 (1991).
Social science evidence is most commonly used to illuminate larger policy questions in con-
stitutional fact-finding. These are referred to as legislative facts. Legislative facts may be sup-
plied by judicial notice, by evidence in the record or by factual material supplied in an amicus or
brief submitted by the parties. The Court generally scrutinizes legislative facts in determining
whether a statute is rationally related to a legitimate government objective. See Dean Alfange, Jr.,
The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 637, 668 (1966).
One commentator explained this distinction as follows:
The paradigm of an adjudicative fact is a description of a past, individual physical or
mental phenomenon, the proof of which is in the record.... A paradigmatic legislative
fact is one that shows the general effect a legal rule will have, and is presented to
encourage the decisionmaker to make a particular legal rule. There is less a sense that
legislative facts are true or knowable because such facts are predictions, and, moreover,
typically predictions about the relative importance of one factor in causing a complex
phenomenon.
Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAD. L. Rnv. 111,
113-14 (1988) (footnotes omitted). As an example, in Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), the
Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of a North Carolina apportionment scheme that
was designed to maximize the political power of black voters. Such a determination requires a
policy-based analysis that might include a study of race relations in the United States. A second
category of constitutional fact is adjudicative fact. In Shaw, adjudicative facts pertained to the
particular formula used in North Carolina for apportionment. For example, a social scientist
might be asked to gather information about the demographic characteristics of the state's popula-
tion in order to determine whether the district was drawn in a way that meets the social objectives
of maximizing minority voting power.
8. Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker note that "[o]btaining social science re-
search has been cumbersome and sometimes controversial; evaluating research has been frustrat-
ing and uncertain; and establishing stable judicial views of particular empirical findings has
proven elusive." Gary L. Francione, Experimentation and the Marketplace Theory of the First
Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 417, 502 n.319 (1987) (quoting Monahan & Walker, supra note
4, at 478).
9. Cf., e.g., Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 403 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that
complex statistical analysis "is subject to misuse and thus must be employed with great care"),
vacated, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
10. Appellate panels can only consider evidence that has been entered on the "record" during
trial. One of the traditional criticisms of amicus briefs is that they bring facts into the judgment
that have not been entered into the record and, therefore, have not been subject to the traditional
safeguards.
11. The Court does not have the same opportunity as trial judges "to make an informed
decision as to the probative value of the analysis." Wilkins, 654 F.2d at 403.
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trial, when statistical and social science evidence is employed, "it will be
the subject of expert testimony and knowledgeable cross-examination from
both sides."" Amicus briefs are not subject to the same safeguards. 3 The
poorly controlled use of social science data by amici curiae may not only be
prejudicial to the parties, but inimical to sound judicial decision-making. 14
The Latin phrase, "amicus curiae," means "friend of the court."' 5 As
Arthur Leff noted, "The practice [of friend of the court briefs] is particu-
larly used in the U.S. Supreme Court, where organizations deeply interested
in an area of constitutional law . . . will frequently petition for and be
granted permission to participate as amicus curiae." 6 The ideal amicus
curiae is one "who, not as [a party], but, just as any stranger might, for the
assistance of the court, gives information of some matter of law in regard to
which the court is doubtful or mistaken, rather than one who gives a highly
partisan account of facts."' 7
Originally these briefs served principally to provide precedents of
12. Id.
13. The methodological rigor of social science evidence introduced in trial courts is tested by
such mechanisms as the rules of evidence, cross-examination, relevancy rulings and jury instruc-
tions. Challenges to experts and their qualifications are common throughout the litigation process,
but do not exist when social science information does not come from the record.
Michael Saks writes:
Trials afford some theoretical protections against the witness being transformed
into an advocate. They must take an oath to tell "the whole truth and nothing but," they
are subject to cross-examination, and they may be countered by rebuttal witnesses or
witnesses called by the court.
But even those few dubious checks are not available in the appellate context.
When psychologists sit down to write Brandeis briefs, they take no oath and are not
subject to cross-examination. In science translation briefs, the merging of the roles of
advocate and expert is complete.
Michael J. Saks, Improving APA Science Translation Amicus Briefs, 17 LAw & Hum. BEAv.
235, 238 (1993).
14. Some members of the legal academy contend that social science undermines judicial
decision-making by the "fallibility of economics and other social sciences (often combined with
illusory certainty based on statistics and graphs); and the logical impossibility that a social science
conclusion, however well founded, could dictate a judicial conclusion." Louis B. Schwartz, Jus-
tice, Expediency, and Beauty, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 141, 143 (1987).
15. The Supreme Court rule states that:
An amicus curiae brief which brings relevant matter to the attention of the Court that has
not already been brought to its attention by the parties is of considerable help to the
Court. An amicus brief which does not serve this purpose simply burdens the staff and
facilities of the Court and its filing is not favored.
Sup. Cr. R. 37.1 ("Brief of an Amicus Curiae").
16. Arthur A. Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE LJ. 1855, 2012
(1985).
17. BRYAN A. GARNER, A DicnoNARY OF MoDERN LEGAL USAGE 40 (1987) (quoting New
England Patriots Football Club v. University of Colorado, 592 F.2d 1196, 1198 n.3 (1st Cir.
1979)).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
which the court was unfamiliar. 8 Early amicus curiae included the United
States,19 state governments, 20 attorneys for client organizations, 21 and lob-
byists representing private and trade organizations. 2 During the nineteenth
century, the amicus curiae was not a device for third parties to intervene in
judicial decision-making. 3 Today, however, many amici are lobbyists or
representatives of private interests with a direct or indirect stake in the out-
come of the litigation.24 The number of amici filing in United States
18. Edmund R. Beckwith & Rudolph Sobernheim, Amicus Curiae-Minister of Justice, 17
FORDHAM L. REv. 38, 38 (1948) (arguing that arnici's role was, in effect, to inform justices of
facts and law of which they were unaware); Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From
Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE LJ. 694, 695 (1963) (stating that the function of the amicus
curiae at common law was one of oral 'Shepardizing,' the bringing up of cases not known to the
judge"). The role of amicus in educating the court was first evidenced in England in the seven-
teenth century. See Protector v. Geering, Hardres 85, 145 Eng. Rep. 394 (1656). The first amici
curiae brief in the United States was submitted when the Supreme Court requested Henry Clay to
aid in determining the application of the Commerce Clause to a land agreement between Kentucky
and Virginia. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
19. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854).
20. The first amicus curiae formally recognized by the Court was the State of Kentucky in
Biddle.
21. Samuel Krislov notes:
[T]he amicus curiae stood in an essentially professional relation to the Court and orga-
nizations were not regarded as the amicus but rather the lawyer himself.... As late as
1919 the attorneys in the Prohibition Case styled themselves as "both of Washington,
D.C., amici curiae, and general counsel to the National Association of Distillers and
Wholesaler Dealers."
Krislov, supra note 18, at 703 (emphasis in original).
22. Id. (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1935)).
23. Id. at 699 ("Oddly, the amicus curiae was neither one of the early devices used to resolve
the third party problem in the Supreme Court nor the most frequently utilized.").
24. In their study of amicus participation in all cases for which filing fees had been paid from
the 1982 term of the Supreme Court, plus all cases in which filing fees had been paid awaiting
decision and thus carried forward from the 1981 term, Caldeira and Wright found that
states account for the largest proportion of total amici .... Other frequent participants
include corporations and business, trade, and professional associations at both the certio-
rari and jurisdictional stage, and, at the plenary stage, citizen groups. As a proportion of
total amici, the least frequent participants at the certiorari and jurisdictional stage are
miscellaneous governmental jurisdictions, public interest law firms, charitable and com-
munity groups, and unions. Organizations, however, greatly outnumber individuals in
total appearances as amici. Amicus participation before the Supreme Court is organiza-
tional by nature; it is not, by and large, a role individuals play.
Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who Partici-
pates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782, 794 (1990); see also HmmERT JACOB, JusTic iN
AMERICA: CouiRTs, LAWYERS & JuDIcIAL PRocEss 42 (4th ed. 1984) (noting participation of
political and private interests); Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating Amicus Curiae:
When Does the Party Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 Am. U. L. REV. 1243, 1257 (1991)
("Even though a set definition of an amicus does not exist, two general categories of amici curiae
have emerged. The first group is comprised of governmental units such as the Federal Govern-
ment and component branches. The second group is comprised of individuals or groups represent-
ing private interests.").
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Supreme Court cases has increased in recent years,' as has the open parti-
sanship of many of the amici briefs.26 Amicus curiae practice has evolved
from a mechanism for aiding the Court to a method of lobbying it.27 This
article discusses the social implications of this transformation, particularly
as it applies to the selective use and misuse of social science research before
the Supreme Court.
Peter Huber coined the phrase "junk science" to refer to questionable
expert testimony in the courtroom.28 "Junk science," Huber writes, "is the
mirror image of real science, with much of the same form but none of the
substance."2 9 He complains that courts permit "self-styled scientists" to en-
gage in "pseudoscientific speculation."30 A central issue in the junk science
debate is the admissibility of expert opinion in the adjudicative process. 3
25. For studies on the frequency of amicus filings before the Supreme Court, see Robert C.
Bradley & Paul Gardner, Underdogs, Upperdogs, and the Use of Amicus Briefs: Trends and
Explanations, 10 Jusr. Sys. J. 78 (1985); Thomas R. Morris, States Before the U.S. Supreme
Court: State Attorneys General as Amici Curiae, 70 JUDIcATURE 298, 299 (1987); Karen
O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Amicus Curiae Participation In the U.S. Supreme Court: An Appraisal
of Hakman's "Folklore," 16 LAW & Soc'x REv. 311 (1981-82); Steven Puro, The United States
as Amicus Curiae, Crs. L. & Jun. PRocass 220, 223 (1981).
26. Feeling that the growing number of amici briefs was politicizing the Court, Justice Frank-
furter attempted to limit their number and scope, arguing, "I do not like to have the Court ex-
ploited as a soap box or as an advertising medium, or as the target, not of arguments but of mere
assertion that this or that group has this or that interest in a question to be decided .... " Justice
Felix Frankfurter, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress (October 28, 1949).
Justice Black, in contrast, defended the use of amici by groups with political agendas, stating,
"Most of the cases that come before the Court involve matters that affect far more people than the
immediate record parties. I think the public interest and judicial administration would be better
served by relaxing rather than tightening the rule against amicus curiae briefs." Justice Hugo
Black, 'Memorandum for the Conference from Hugo L. Black," Earl Warren Papers, Library of
Congress (April 9, 1954). Justice Black's view prevailed. See RoBERT L. STEmN & EuGENE
GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRAcnca § 6.40 (5th ed. 1978) ("Contrary to its practice a genera-
tion ago, the Court is now liberal in granting motions for leave to file amicus briefs.").
The contemporary Court approves approximately ninety percent of all private party motions
for leave to file amicus curiae briefs. Bradley & Gardner, supra note 25, at 91, tbl. 2.
27. See generally Fowler V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 1172 (1953) (describing the history of amicus filings in the Supreme Court).
28. PmE HUBER, GAIEo's REVENGE: JuNK SCIENcE iN TE COuRTROoM 2 (1991).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 3. Huber notes that "[t]he best test of certainty we have is good science-the
science of publication, replication, and verification, the science of consensus and peer review.' Id.
at 228. These standards are often ignored in amicus curiae briefs that present empirical evidence.
31. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), the Court dealt
with the admissibility of expert testimony about scientific evidence. The case stemmed from a
products liability lawsuit filed by the parents of two boys born with limb deformities, allegedly
caused by their mother's ingestion of the anti-nausea drug Bendectin during pregnancy. Id. at
2791. The data relied upon by plaintiff's experts came from four sources: (a) "in vivo" animal
studies; (b) "in vitro" studies; (c) pharmacological studies; and (d) epidemiological studies of the
incidence of birth defects of various types in the offspring of women who took Bendectin during
pregnancy and those of women who did not. Id. at 2791-92. The issue in Daubert was whether
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This article does not examine the issue of junk science in the form of expert
testimony in trials.32 Instead, we explore the difficulties arising from advo-
the rule of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which only allows the introduction
of evidence that is "generally accepted" by the scientific community, has a continuing vitality. Id.
at 2792-93. When Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, there was no mention
as to whether the Frye rule of "general acceptance" survived its passage. The federal circuits
disagreed as to whether Frye was still in force. Id. at 2792-93.
The federal district court in Daubert excluded expert testimony on causation, holding that
human or epidemiological evidence is the only reliable proof. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
held that an expert witness's testimony must be predicated on a research method or technique that
does not "diverge significantly from the procedures accepted by the recognized authorities in the
field." Id.
The Daubert Court held unanimously that the Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye, provide
the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in federal trials. Daubert thus effectively
killed the Frye rule. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2790, 2799.
Three circuits had held that the Frye rule was dead: United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786,
790 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); DeLuca v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.,
911 F.2d 941, 955 (3rd Cir. 1990); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
Six circuits had held that Frye continued: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Inc., 951
F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320, vacated and remanded, 113 S.
Ct. 2786 (1993); Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d
56, 60 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted and vacated, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc);
United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54,
59-61 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195,
1203 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986).
32. Daubert increases the need for judges to have an understanding of the social sciences.
After Daubert, the admissibility of social science evidence in all federal trials will be determined
by the Federal Rules of Evidence, not by the Frye Rule. Post-Daubert social science evidence is
admissible if the trial judge determines whether a given expert has scientific knowledge that will
assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. FED. R. EviD. 104(a). Rule 702
requires the trial judge to make the determination of whether an expert's testimony "rests on a
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799. Trial judges
might find the task of qualifying social scientist experts to be more difficult than physical science
experts because of division within the social science disciplines. For example, a behavioral psy-
chologist sees human motivations as a result of response to a stimulus and would have no sympa-
thy with a Freudian explanation of the same behavior. In many issues of human behavior,
multiple disciplines may have some explanatory role, making it extremely difficult for one indi-
vidual to be an expert on all aspects of the phenomenon.
A judge in a scientific testimony case stated: "Communication by speech does not fall within
any one established category of science. Its understanding requires a knowledge of anatomy,
physiology, physics, psychology, and lingnistics." Paul C. Gianelli, Frye v. United States: Back-
ground paper prepared for the National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists, Symposium on
Science and Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 188, 193 (1983).
More social science is likely to be introduced into legal matters with the displacement of the
Frye Rule. For all practical purposes, Rule 702 permits most social scientific testimony to be
received by the fact-finder. The rules do not give any particular weight to the professional train-
ing of social scientists. An expert is anyone who has specialized knowledge or training that will
assist the trier of fact. Rule 703 requires experts giving opinion testimony to state the facts or data
on which they rely:
The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
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cacy disguised as social science in amicus curiae briefs..
Amici briefs serve a useful purpose. They provide the Justices with
varied viewpoints and with information about social science findings of
which they might not otherwise be aware. There is nothing inherently
wrong with presenting social science data in advocacy briefs. The problem
is in the lack of appropriate mechanisms to permit the Court to evaluate the
findings adequately.33 Our solution is not to restrict the admissibility of
scientific material. We propose enlarging the amount of information avail-
able to the Justices by providing the Court with the services of disinterested
social science experts.
This Article uses the claim that there has been a punitive damages
explosion-a claim made in amicus briefs submitted to the United States
Supreme Court-to illustrate the use and misuse of social science data in
constitutional fact-finding. Our purpose is not to attack the tort reformers
of punitive damages. The current institution of amicus briefs encourages
advocacy-type briefs in all substantive fields. We use the current struggle
over punitive damages to illustrate the ways that social science data in leg-
islative fact-finding is distorted for partisan purposes. We also use it to
suggest some mechanisms by which the Court can obtain a more neutral
analysis of relevant social science data.
Part II traces the rise of social science in Supreme Court cases from the
original Brandeis Brief in 1906 to the present. This section explores the
role of legal realism in shaping the contemporary use of amicus briefs in
introducing extra-legal facts to the Court. Part I describes the uses and
misuses of social science in the Supreme Court's three most recent cases
dealing with the constitutionality of punitive damages and summarizes five
leading studies on punitive damages. Part IV examines the ways in which
partisan organizations distort empirical social science research in amicus
briefs. A review of the amici briefs in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp.,34 and the two previous Supreme Court decisions on the
constitutionality of punitive damage decisions35 uncovered no fabrications,
but it did reveal a pattern of selective distortion of social science findings.
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EvrD. 703. Daubert thus increases the need for greater quality controls over social science
at all levels.
33. See Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Prod-
ucts Liability, 39 UCLA L. Rnv. 731, 733-35 (1992) (noting that shocking anecdotes of questiona-
ble accuracy have interfered with our understanding of the civil litigation system).
34. 13 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
35. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ver-
mont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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Among the most common tactics are producing studies designed for advo-
cacy purposes, making normative statements that appear to be empirically
based, and quoting studies out of context. In Part V we propose several
mechanisms to aid the Court in evaluating social science in amici briefs.
These proposals include: providing court-appointed social science experts;
creating social science special masters; increasing government funding for
independent social science research into contested claims; encouraging so-
cial science associations to file amici briefs that support neither side; ex-
panding disclosure of the methodology; and providing underlying data cited
in amicus briefs.
The presentation of social scientific data in Supreme Court amicus cu-
riae briefs is too often designed to persuade rather than to inform the Court.
Most authors of amici briefs are lobbyists whose primary goal is to advance
the interests of their clients. They are not guided by the scientific norms of
neutrality and objectivity but by the ideology of advocacy. The desire to
win the case encourages the amici to distort or ignore any damaging social
science findings. As Saks notes, "Once one sets (or resets) one's goal as
supporting a certain conclusion, one tends to canvass the literature selec-
tively, retrieve selectively, and interpret studies in ways calculated to lead
to the desired conclusion.- 36
II. THE RISE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN CONsTIUTIoNAL FACT-FINDING
A. Sociological Jurisprudence
The dominant paradigm37 of legal formalism kept social science statis-
tics almost entirely out of constitutional fact-finding prior to the 1920s.31
36. Saks, supra note 13, at 243.
37. The term "paradigm" was coined by Thomas S. Kuhn in THE STRucruRn OF ScimNrr=c
REVOLUTnONS 10 (1962). Kuhn defined a paradigm as a viewpoint that shapes a given field of
inquiry. Id. The paradigmatic shifts in legal thought are described in Peter C. Schanck, Under-
standing Postmodern Thought and its Implications For Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L.
R-v. 2505, 2507 (1992) (arguing that "sometimes one paradigm is hegemonic; at other times
paradigms compete among theorists for acceptance").
38. The dominant paradigm from the mid-1800s to the early twentieth century was legal
formalism. See Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness:
The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America 1850-1940, 3 REs. L. & Soc'Y 3 (1980). Legal
formalists describe law as "an emanation from a single authority in the State, or as a complete
body of explicit and comprehensive propositions applicable, by accurate interpretation, to all
claims, relationships and conflicts of interest." Sm CARLEON K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 28
(5th ed. 1958). The legal realists attacked this doctrine, railing against concepts such as the "rea-
sonable man" and "proximate cause." Id. at 41-63.
The orthodox scholarship was the analysis of judicial decision-making, not empirical
fact-finding. The patron saint of paper rules was Harvard University Law School Dean Christo-
pher Columbus Langdell. American legal education is a relatively recent social institution. Law
instruction was first offered at Harvard in 1817, but it was not until the last decades of thnt century
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The incorporation of sociological data into judicial decision-making is the
result of the legal realist movement.39 Legal realism was an early attempt
to replace armchair legal philosophy with an awareness of social
context.4° Supporters argued that social scientific studies of law should be
used to discover and analyze the difference between the law in action and
that Langdell developed and instituted the "case method" of legal education. Langdell believed
that by reading casebooks with their law professors, students could discover the essential princi-
ples of the science of law. See Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J.
LEGAL HLTr. 329 (1979); Anthony Chase, Origins of Modem Professional Education: The
Harvard Case Method Conceived as Clinical Instruction in Law, 5 NovA L.J. 323 (1980).
39. Professor Donald Elliott stated that under "one guise or another, the question, 'by what
right do courts and bureaucrats make law?' has occupied a large percentage of the energy of
American legal scholars. In the twentieth century, the dominant answers have been essentially
'positivism' and its second cousin, 'legal realism."' E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition
in Jurisprudence, 85 COLuM. L. Rv. 38, 91-92 (1985).
Legal realism was a
[Ilegal movement of the 1920s and 1930s composed of American law teachers and
lawyers who studied the operation of law and society, rather than its abstract conceptu-
alism.... The legal realists sought to replace legal formalism, or the case method and
scientific approach to law, with social methods and psychological analysis, to achieve
proper social policy.
KENN~r R. REDDEN & GERRY W. BEYER, MODERN DIcrnoNARY FOR Ta LEGAL PROFESSION
490 (1993). Legal realists examined the "way the law operated in the social context instead of
promoting a study of what the appellate courts said was the law or what the scholars said the law
should be." JOHN W. JOHNsON, AMERICAN LEGAL CUrLTUR, 1908-1940, at 132 (1981). Abstract
doctrinalism was criticized for not explaining what lawyers needed to know-what judges were
likely to do.
The legal realists argued that legal precedents shape and were shaped by a great number of
social forces. RoscoE POUND, THE SPInrr OF =EE CoMMON LAW 182-83 (1921) ("[The] doctrine
of precedents means that causes are to be judged by principles reached inductively from the judi-
cial experience of the past, not by deduction from rules established arbitrarily by the sovereign
will.") They viewed law as constantly evolving, a product of changing political, economic and
social facts. See generally RoscoE POUND, LAW FINDrNG THROUGH ExPERIENCE AND REASON:
THREE LEcruiEs (1960) (discussing lawmaking and legal reasoning and the doctrine of stare
decisis). Legal realists believed that because society is at every point changing, the law must also
change.
40. Columbia University Law School was the leading legal realist law school in the 1920s.
JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 132-33. Columbia Professors Underhill Moore, William 0. Douglas,
Hessel Yntema, Karl Llewellyn, Edwin Paterson, Noel Dowling, Julius Goebel, Jerome Michael,
Samuel Klaus, and L.A. Tulin were all central figures in the realist school. Wnum TWINING,
KAL LLawaLuLN AND nm REAST Movm4sENr 54-67 (1973). During the 1920s, Columbia's
law faculty restructured its curriculum to incorporate social science into every course. Id. Pro-
fessor Underhill Moore was a leading empiricist who argued that the focus of an "institutional"
analysis of law should be on patterns of human behavior rather than on abstract legal doctrines.
Moore favored a level of analysis that examined functional properties of social structure. For
example, he conducted an extensive empirical study of stop payment orders. Underhill Moore et
al., Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to Stop Payment of Checks-lf. Institu-
tional Method," 42 YALE L.J. 1198-99 (1933); see also John H. Schlegel," American Legal Realism
and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REa. 195
(1980) (describing Underhill Moore's use of empirical research to study legal behavior).
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the law in the books.4 1 Realism was a multi-paradigmatic movement draw-
ing support from disaffected positivists,42  rule skeptics, 43  and
41. Even defining which social sciences are relevant to law is not easy. Most would proba-
bly see sociology, economics, political science, and psychology as providing the major impetus
for the social scientific study of law. Law is studied by sociologists as a social phenomenon. The
economist studies law in its own terms as an economic phenomenon. The psychologist might
view the law empirically as a psychological phenomenon, but also as a system of reinforcers.
Political scientists might study how law is legislated. Law may also be of interest to the economic
geographer, social historian, community psychiatrist or epidemiologist.
42. What the positivists have in common is a focus on the law as an absolute. Realists, in
sharp contrast, are less concerned with the primary rules of law. Lon Fuller states that positivists
view the law as "a manifested fact of social authority or power, to be studied for what it is and
does, and not for what it is trying to do or become." LoN Fulum, THE MORALIrT OF LAW 145
(1969). Positivists view the law as a system of normative rules-the law in the books.
Realists, on the other hand, focus on the law in action. Realists attempt to understand the
social impact of law and the impact of society on law. In the words of Steven Salbu:
Two central currents in jurisprudence-legal positivism and legal realism-have long
occupied opposing ground regarding the relationship between normative philosophy and
the law. Positivists regard the law as a mechanism of rule that is largely self-justifying
by virtue of the power behind it. Realist viewpoints are more analytical and critical, and
focus on understanding the political and economic interests that can become ingredients
in the creation and development of laws.
Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble with Law-Based Concep-
tions of Ethics, 68 IND. LJ. 101, 124 (1992).
Thomas Hobbes was the first legal positivist. He believed that man originally lived a "soli-
tary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" life in a state of nature. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATIAN 80
(Richard Tuck ed., 1991). Hobbes argued that men formed a social contract to establish order and
safety and to escape the misery of the "war of all against all." Id. at 97. He contended that the
absolute power of the sovereign was the only source of law. John Locke, on the other hand,
liberalized the notion of social contract, arguing that men had common sense and therefore could
cooperate for the common good without living under the yoke of absolutism. JOHN LocaE, THE
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, OF Civn. GovERNwr AND LErER oN ToLERAION 3 (J.W.
Gough ed., 2d ed. 1956).
Jeremy Bentham built upon Hobbes and Locke in his positivist theory of utilitarianism. Util-
itarianism espoused the principle that "the greatest satisfaction of the greatest number of people
should be the primary moral goal for each individual." REDDEN & BEYER, supra note 39, at 773.
John Austin (1790-1859) expanded upon Bentham's concept of the greatest good for the
greatest number. Austin defined law as "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being
by an intelligent being having power over him." JOHN AusIN, The Province of Jurisdiction
Defined, in LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 104 (John Murray ed., 1890).
Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart are the two most prominent modem legal positivists. Kelsen
maintained, "a rule is a legal rule because it provides for a sanction." HANS KELSEN, GENERAL
THnoERY oF LAW AND STATE 29 (1961). Kelsen's position was that each legal norm emanated
from a higher authority, which he termed the Grundnorm. Id. at 31.
43. Moore describes rule skepticism as a disenchantment with textual interpretivism. He
states:
mhe skeptic finds both legal texts (statutes, constitutions) and prior case decisions
woefully indeterminate. His judge "interprets" legal texts by finding what he wants in
them-for neither nature nor convention binds his interpretive efforts, the words of legal
texts becoming mere chameleons in his hands. Because past cases exemplify an infinite
number of rules, any choice of rules can be consistent with precedent-so long as one
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empiricists.44 Realists were united by a belief that judges devoted too much
attention to the language of prior cases and too little to understanding the
social reality behind their own decisions.45
An important precursor to the legal realists, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
contended that judicial decision-makers needed to utilize the findings of
social science. Holmes taught that an ideal system of law should draw its
postulates and legislative justifications from science.4 In The Common
Law, Holmes stated the epigram that served as the slogan of legal realists
everywhere: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence."'47 Holmes predicted a convergence of law and the social sciences in
constitutional decision-making: "For the rational study of the law the black
letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the
man of statistics and the master of economics. 48
Roscoe Pound furthered the ideas of Justice Holmes by arguing for a
sociological jurisprudence focused on the social context of legal disputes.4 9
Pound wrote:
The doctrine of precedents means that causes are to be judged by
principles reached inductively from the judicial experience of the
past, not by deduction from rules established arbitrarily by the
sovereign will.... The common law doctrine is one of reason
applied by experience. It assumes that experience will afford the
most satisfactory foundation for standards of action and principles
of decision.5 0
There were many others who advocated the expanded use of social
analysis in law."' For example, Hugo Munsterberg maintained that answers
to legal dilemmas could be found in the findings of modem psychology. 2
denies, as does the skeptic, that there are any natural kinds or conventional categories
that would limit the rules he might choose.
Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L.
REv. 871, 888 (1989); see also Felix Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J.
201 (1931) (elaborating upon rule skepticism).
44. TvINNG, supra note 40, at 54-67.
45. Id. at 283.
46. OLvER W. HouAns, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881).
47. Id. at 1.
48. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
49. Roscoe Pound, the Dean of Harvard Law School during the 1930s and 1940s, was also a
major influence on Llewellyn and the realists. JomsoN, supra note 39, at 126-37.
50. RoscoE PouND, THa Spmr OF THE COMMON LAW 182-83 (1921).
51. For an excellent discussion of the use of empirical research methods by the legal realists,
see E. PURcEL, THE Cusis OF DEmocA c THEORY 74-94 (1973); John H. Schlegel, American
Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BuFF. L. RE,. 459,
460-64 (1979).
52. He observed that "[t]he lawyer and the judge and the juryman ... go on thinking that
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He declared that law itself could not be studied without the aid of the social
sciences.5S Karl Llewellyn54 and Benjamin Cardozo55 also championed the
development of an empirically based legal sociology. Contemporary heirs
to the legal realists,56 in both law and the social sciences, call for an even
closer relationship between the two disciplines. 57
B. The Brandeis Brief
As legal realism replaced legal formalism, the courts became increas-
ingly receptive to the introduction of empirical research.58 Louis Brandeis,
their legal instinct and their common sense supplies them with all that is needed and something
more." HUNTINGTON CMmNs, LAw AND TE SOCIAL SCMNCES 169 (1936).
53. Id.
54. Karl Llewellyn wrote:
Logic and science can tell us, and tell us with some certainty, what the doctrinal pos-
sibilities are. They can tell us whether, without self-contradiction the results of the
cases can be so settled as to stand together. They can even provide us with a tool for
argument to a court that the cases should be made in this fashion to stand together. But
they give us no certainty as to whether the possibility embodied in the argument will be
adopted by a given court.
KARL N. LLEwELYN, THE BRAMLE BusH: SoME LEaruEs ON LAW AND ITs STUDY 62-63
(1930).
Llewellyn charged that the estrangement between law and the social sciences was due par-
tially to the unwillingness of other disciplines to deal with legal scholars. He complained that he
found little "neighborliness, let alone brotherliness, from the side of the social disciplines, or of
sociology in particular." Karl N. Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology,
62 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 1287 (1949).
55. Justice Benjamin Cardozo "encourage[d] judges to rely on the social sciences, and in
particular the fledgling science of sociology." John C. P. Goldberg, Community and the Common
Law Judge: Reconstructing Cardozo's Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1324, 1368
(1990).
56. The heyday of Legal Realism was in the 1920s and 1930s. Schlegel, supra note 51, at
459. The paradigm was gradually replaced by normatively-based views of legal reasoning. Id.
57. For example, Professor Donald Black has recently proposed a new legal sociology, fo-
cusing on what he dubs the "social structure of a case." DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSCacE
8, 112 (1989). According to Black, modem legal conceptualists are mistaken "in attempting to
locate legal rules in a social vacuum." Id. at 19. These neo-formalists err when they strive to
identify fundamental precepts without employing social science findings. Black contrasts the pov-
erty of jurisprudence with the power of sociological knowledge, arguing that social science is
more useful than jurisprudence for predicting legal outcomes. Id. at 8. As examples, he cites
factors such as social status of the parties, their degree of intimacy, and whether they are individu-
als or organizations as powerful predictors of legal outcomes. Id. at 89. Social characteristics
predict in large part: "Who has a complaint against whom? Who handles it? Who else is in-
volved?" Id. at 7. Knowing the judge's and victim's race, ethnicity, social background, and
financial standing are critical in knowing the outcome of a case. Id. at 64. Traditional jurists
rarely consider how class, race, power and social change impact the law. Id. at 90.
58. Professor David Kaye enumerates examples of social science evidence found in recent
court cases involving theft, mass murder, discrimination by race, age and gender, voting rights,
antitrust, taxation, domestic relations, environmental torts and product liability. David H. Kaye,
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as a young Boston lawyer,59 made the first significant use of social science
data in constitutional decision-making via a brief for the petitioner in
Muller v. Oregon.' The Brandeis brief employed social science research to
argue contested constitutional facts before the Court.61 The Court received
Statistics for Lawyers and Law for Statistics, 89 Mici. L. R-v. 1520, 1521 (1991) (reviewing
MicHAEL 0. FNKEIsTErN & BRUCE LnvrN, STATISTICS FOR LAwYERs (1990)).
59. Brandeis, later to serve as a distinguished Supreme Court Justice for twenty-three years,
was a progressive figure in American jurisprudence. See generally ALL.AN GAL, BANDms OF
BOSTON (1980) (describing the emergence of Brandeis as an attorney for the people). For ac-
counts of Louis Brandeis' later career, see ALFRED LmiF, BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HIsTORY OF
AN AMERicAN IDEA (1936) and ANmroNY MASON, BRnAsEis: A FREE MAN's Lna (1946).
60. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). In Muller, the Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of
a 1903 Oregon statute that limited "the employment of females at any time so that they shall not
work more than ten hours during the twenty-four hours of any one day." Muller, 208 U.S. at
416-17. A manager working for Curt Muller, a Portland laundry owner, ordered a female laun-
dress to work for more than ten hours in one twenty-four hour period. Muller was fined ten
dollars and appealed his conviction to the Oregon Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower
court's decision. The final appeal was to the United States Supreme Court, which heard the case
three years after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the hallmark of legal formalism. In
Lochner, the Court struck down a New York law, which sought to limit the hours of bakery
employees to sixty hours in a week or ten hours in a day, as an unreasonable interference with
liberty of contract, violative of the Due Process Clause. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52-53. Lochner was
consistent with formalistic jurisprudence, which infused the Social Darwinistic philosophy of so-
cial contractualism into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
61. Brandeis devoted only three pages of his brief to legal precedent. This strategy was
hardly surprising given Lochner, and he readily conceded that, under the established precedent,
"the right to purchase or to sell labor was part of the 'liberty' protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution." Muller, 208 U.S. at 415. However, he also argued:
The facts of common knowledge of which the court may take judicial notice establish
conclusively, that there is reasonable ground for holding that to permit women in Ore-
gon to work in a "mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry" more than ten hours
in one day is dangerous to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.
Id. at 416 (quoting an abstract from Brandeis's brief). Brandeis's brief was calculated to displace
formalistic notions of liberty of contract to allow the Court to take judicial notice of social facts.
All but the fast three pages were devoted to social scientific studies of the deleterious impact of
work on women's health. Louis B, AnEis & JosanmNm GoLDMArCIi, WOMEN rN INDUSTRY
22-32 (Leon Stein & Philip Taft eds., 1969). Topics included: state laws limiting women's hours
of labor (including a list of foreign countries having protective legislation); "The World's Experi-
ence Upon Which the Legislation Limiting the Hours of Work for Women is Based"; safety and
health dangers of long hours; physical differences between the sexes; description of manufactur-
ing jobs; benefits of shorter hours on health, home life and general welfare; economic aspects of
shorter hours; uniformity of restriction; "The Reasonableness of the Ten-Hour Day; and Laun-
dries." Id.
The scope of Brandeis's research was impressive. He and his sister-in-law, Josephine Gold-
mark, summarized all available government reports on official government research conducted by
the United States, France, Germany, Italy and other Western industrial nations. The brief also
summarized the studies conducted by the Health Department of the City of New York and in-
cluded all of the studies compiled by the British Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops.
Each study supported the statute's premise that long work hours were detrimental to women.
Brandeis's prodigious efforts in assembling these studies showed that the Oregon statute was a
reasonable exercise of police power, because it safeguarded women against the hazards of long
hours. Id. See generally Monahan & Walker, supra note 4, at 480 ("[Justice Brandeis] assembled
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this document into evidence stating, "[w]e take judicial cognizance of all
matters of general knowledge."62 Brandeis's brief would be assessed
harshly as junk social science by today's standards.63 However, the brief
was a brilliant break with the formalist tradition and had a significant im-
pact on legal thought.' a As Martha Minow notes, the Brandeis brief
a substantial body of medical and social science research tending to show the debilitating effect on
women of working long hours.").
62. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
63. Brandeis's presentation to the Court was slanted because, like all parties' briefs, the doc-
ument was designed to further the interests of the client. His brief did little more than provide the
Court with a carefully selected laundry list of studies, including some that were arguably biased
because they had been produced for the purpose of promoting social welfare legislation. He
avoided mentioning available empirical studies demonstrating the deleterious impact of long
working hours on men. Despite these limitations, the Brandeis brief was a remarkable document
written in the heyday of legal formalism.
Brandeis once remarked that his famous brief should have been titled, "What Any Fool
Knows." DEAN AcHEsoN, MoRmNG AND NooN 53 (1965) (quoting Brandeis). Felix Cohen sati-
rized the Brandeis Brief as implicating the favorable world and domestic opinions of the undis-
puted sanity of the Oregon legislature when it restricted the hours of industrial labor for women.
Since a recent test of legislative legitimacy under the Due Process Clause protected legislation
when it was such that "rational men may approve," Cohen perceived that the Supreme Court had
been transformed into a "lunacy commission... sitting in judgment upon the mental capacity of
legislators." Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLum. L.
REv. 809, 819 (1935). On the other hand, Cohen acknowledged that the Brandeis brief was a
healthy alternative to the "transcendental nonsense" of formalistic doctrines such as "freedom of
contract." Cohen wrote:
Some fifty years ago a great German jurist had a curious dream. He dreamed that he
died and was taken to a special heaven reserved for the theoreticians of the law. In this
heaven one met, face to face, the many concepts of jurisprudence in their absolute pu-
rity, freed from all entangling alliances with human life. Here were the disembodied
spirits of good faith and bad faith, property, possession, laches, and rights in rein....
The question is raised, "How much of contemporary legal thought moves in the pure
ether of Von Jhering's heaven of legal concepts."
Id. at 809.
64. Brandeis's brief illustrates Karl Llewellyn's contention that the American system of
precedents was "[m]alleable even when handled by a formalist judge, and they can be refash-
ioned much more easily." KARL LLEwELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA § 4, at 3-4
(Paul Gewirtz ed. & Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989). Llewellyn contended that the unsystematic
and uncodified nature of American law gave it the flexibility to be adaptable "for new circum-
stances." Id. at 4. Brandeis employed his famous brief to convince the Court that it was lunacy to
presume that laundresses sold their labor on equal terms with laundry owners, which was assumed
by the jurisprudence of formalistic social contractualism. If the logic of formalistic contract the-
ory was adopted, he would surely lose. Brandeis's focused on law as experience, not abstracted
law. Brandeis wrote:
Politically, the American workingman is free-so far as law can make him so. But is he
really free? Can any man be really free who is constantly in danger of becoming depen-
dent for mere subsistence upon somebody and something else than his own exertion and
conduct? Men are not free while financially dependent upon the will of other individu-
als. Financial dependence is consistent with freedom only where claim to support rests
upon right, and not upon favor.
Louis D. BrANDms, Busunss-A PRoFEssioN 53 (1933).
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"marked a creative shift for the Court, introducing the use of vivid, factual
detail as a way to break out of the formalist categories dominating the anal-
ysis."'65 Not surprisingly, significant citations of social science facts in judi-
cial opinions began with the 1916 appointment of Louis Brandeis to the
Supreme Court. Brandeis found an ally in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who
had been a Justice since 1902.
C. The Slow Acceptance of Social Science by the Court
The majority of the Court in the 1920s and 1930s were legal formalists
who saw no role for extra-legal facts. Brandeis and Holmes often cited
social science sources, but their legal realist arguments very rarely carried
the day.66 For example, Brandeis cited a social science article on unfair
trade practices to bolster his dissenting opinion that a cotton products manu-
facturer and distributor was engaging in anticompetitive activities.67 The
Gratz majority, however, held that the government's antitrust activities
were impermissible violations of corporate liberties.68 Abstract legal apho-
risms, such as freedom of contract, were the basis of many judicial deci-
sions during this period.69 Extra-legal facts were castigated when they
conflicted with the Court's restrictive vision of substantive due process.7 °
For example, Chief Justice William Howard Taft wrote in Truax v. Corri-
gan7' that an Arizona law permitting picketing and boycotting of a restau-
rant was unconstitutional because it helped organized labor at the expense
of business. Disinterested in the real-world power imbalances that led to
this law, Chief Justice Taft attacked the legislation for favoring one class
65. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARv. L. REv. 10, 88-89 (1987).
66. The legal realists, Holmes and Brandeis, became known as the "Great Dissenters" be-
cause their philosophical views so often placed them in the minority. Steven L. Winter, Indeter-
minacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. Rv. 1443, 1460-62 (1990).
Winter writes:
The "crucible" that shaped modem constitutional law was the confrontation between the
Old Court and the legislative efforts of the Progressive Era and the New Deal. The most
influential manifestos of this conflict were not the legal realist assaults on the intellec-
tual foundations of formalism, but rather the decades of dissents by Holmes and Bran-
deis-the "Great Dissenters"--who had been venerated by progressives and realists
alike. These dissents opposed judicial interference with social and economic legislation.
But they also supported judicial protection of civil liberties.
Id. at 1461 (footnotes omitted).
67. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 438 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(referring the Court to H. B. REED, THE MORALS OF MONOPOLY AND COM'amoN 120-22
(1916)), overruled, Federal Trade Conm'n v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
68. Id. at 429 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
69. PAUL L. RosEN, THE SuEmam COURT AND SOCIL SCIENCE 98-99 (1972).
70. Id.
71. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
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over another, declaring it to be nothing more than an "experiment in Sociol-
ogy. ''72 Justices Brandeis and Holmes, the legal realists on the Court, dis-
sented (along with Justice Pickney), arguing that this statute did not violate
equal protection guarantees.73
It was not until social and political upheavals caused by the Depression
of the 1930s sensitized the Court to issues of social equality that references
to social science research became an accepted practice.74 The year 1937 is
often referred to as a "watershed" year, marking the transition from a for-
malist to a realist Court.75 The New Deal Court gradually repudiated the
formalism of the Lochner era76 and became more willing to consider ex-
72. Justice Taft wrote in the majority opinion that such a classification cannot be upheld as a
legalized experiment in sociology; the very purpose of the Constitution was to prevent experimen-
tation with the fundamental rights of the individual. Id. at 338.
73. In a statement typical of the legal Realist perspective, Justice Brandeis described the
distinction between just and excessive punishment as "the difference between unrestrained power
and that which is exercised under the spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish jus-
tice." Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407,435 (1921) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,381 (1910)). It was the spirit
with which power was being exercised that was critical, rather than the abstract notions of right
and wrong championed by the Formalists.
74. Erwin Chemerinsky describes the demise of formalism under the economic pressures of
the Depression:
In the 1930's, economic pressures from the Depression, political opposition by the
Roosevelt Administration, and intellectual assaults by the legal Realists highlighted the
anti-majoritarian character ofjudicial review. The Supreme Court's invalidation of pop-
ular New Deal Legislation made it especially vulnerable to such criticisms. By the late
1930's, the new Justices had to define a role for the judiciary that did not offend their
earlier criticisms of the Lochner era Court. This was not simply a matter of appearance
or strategy; a strong consensus existed that the previous Court had acted improperly in
striking down needed social and economic legislation. In fact, since the mid-1930's,
discussions about constitutional law have been dominated by a desire to devise a role for
the Supreme Court that avoids the evils of Lochnerism.
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Forevord The Vanishing Constitution,
103 HARv. L. REv. 43, 63 (1989).
75. Winter writes:
The year 1937 is widely recognized as a watershed, reflecting a major shift in the legal/
social consensus on the constitutional status of the New Deal's regulatory programs....
The decisions that manifested this paradigm shift in constitutional law were West Coast
Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (due process), and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (commerce clause). But the shift manifested itself in
other areas as well. A similar upheaval in federal civil procedure occurred in 1938 with
the decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Winter, supra note 66, at 1463 n.96.
76. The Court's upholding of the state of Washington's minimum-wage law for women and
minors in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), is just one of many examples of
the New Deal Court's recognition of changing political realities. As Justice Hughes stated, the
"Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract." Id. at 391. He wrote: "We may take
judicial notice of the unparalleled demands for relief which arose during the recent period of
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tra-legal facts in its deliberations.77 In Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co.,
v. United States,78 the Court cited a study of the procedures of the Austra-
lian Tariff Board in deciding whether a Norwegian importer had the right to
a hearing under the American Tariff Act of 1922.79 In another case, Justice
Brandeis concurred with a dissenting opinion in Hartford Steam Boiler In-
spection & Insurance Co. v. Harrison,"0 which used a study of the rise of
mutual life insurance companies in Great Britain to bolster the contention
that it was constitutional for the state of Georgia to treat stock companies
differently than mutual companies. 8 In reviewing a tax court decision, Jus-
tice Stone cited research by economists that cast doubt on the policy justifi-
cation for granting tax immunity to federal government employees." John
Monahan and Laurens Walker note that, "[b]y the 1930's, classifying so-
cial science as fact was deeply ingrained in the thinking of the Court."83
The amicus brief became the mechanism for receiving social fact into judi-
cial decision-making. 4
As the Court became more willing to entertain extra-legal facts, polit-
ical groups began to file amicus curiae briefs in significant numbers. Pro-
gressive groups frequently used amicus briefs to lobby the Court in socially
depression." Id. at 399. Such a decision was totally contrary to the abstracted logic of freedom of
contract that was central to the philosophy of the legal formalists.
See generally MORTON J. HoRwrrz, Tm TRANsFoRMATIoN OF AMEmRCAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THm CRIsis OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992) (tracing transformation of legal thought from classicism
to realism as beginning with the hostile response to the Court's decision in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905)). Roscoe Pound, the founder of sociological jurisprudence, attacked Lochner
as an example of the injustices that resulted from ignoring social context. See Roscoe Pound,
Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.. 454, 479-87 (1909). But see Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era
Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1, 3 (1991) (arguing
that the transformation from the Lochner era is more complex than frequently depicted).
77. For example, Justice Cardozo used economic data in an opinion that upheld the Social
Security Act of 1935. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 567 (1937) (noting amounts
appropriated under the Act during previous fiscal years).
78. 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
79. Id. at 314.
80. 301 U.S. 459, 466 n.6 & n.7 (1937) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing social sciences ency-
clopedia in resolution of insurance issues).
81. Justice McReynold's majority opinion held that the Georgia Stale Insurance Commission
was violating the Equal Protection Clause by forbidding insurance stock companies to act through
salaried agents while permitting mutual companies to act through such agents. Id. at 463.
82. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 485 (1939) (citing policy-oriented
studies).
83. Monahan & Walker, supra note 4, at 481.
84. Monahan and Walker write: "Yet, the routine treatment of social research as fact did not
account for the anomalous practice Brandeis had initiated in the Muller case. How could Brandeis
briefs be submitted initially to the Supreme Court without having the facts first tested by the
confrontational procedures of a trial court?" Id. at 482.
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charged cases, such as those involving desegregation,85 "un-American ac-
tivities,"86 and progressive social legislation. 7 Harper and Etherington
write, "By the October 1948 term amici briefs had become a genuine prob-
lem for the justices and their clerks. In that term there were 75 [amicus]
briefs filed in 57 cases."88
The Warren Court was the first to use social science data exten-
sively.89 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka90 is the best known exam-
ple of the Warren Court's use of empirical research to evaluate whether
constitutional principles had been violated. Footnote eleven in the Court's
decision reviewed empirical work by professional social scientists, which
showed that segregated school facilities caused psychological and social
harm to school children.91 The Court cited seven social science studies
supporting the proposition that separate is inherently unequal.92 This social
scientific evidence repudiated the nineteenth century legal formalism that
had been used to validate segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson.93
85. In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the Committee of Law Teachers Against Seg-
regation in Legal Education filed a brief urging the Court to desegregate the nation's schools.
86. A flood of amicus briefs were filed in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), and,
as part of its effort to stem the tide of advocacy-type briefs, the Court went so far as to deny "leave
to file [a] brief of Richard E. Westbrooks and Earl B. Dickerson." Id. at 494. The Dennis plain-
tiffs were charged with conspiracy in filing false affidavits to support a complaint before the
National Labor Relations Board. The NLRB required that affidavits attest that union officers were
not members of the Communist party or any other organization which advocated the overthrow of
the United States government by illegal means. The Court held that the statute prohibiting advo-
cacy of the violent overthrow of the United States government would be sustained only if govern-
ment proved a "clear and present danger" of substantive evil. Id. at 509-15.
87. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (amicus brief filed on
behalf of the State of Washington in support of constitutionality of minimum wage legislation).
88. Harper & Etherington, supra note 27, at 1172.
89. Paul Rosen noted that Brown represented a culmination of the pervasive impact of social
science upon law. "The basic point is that the Court's pronounced interest in fact-finding repre-
sented a long trend in judicial interpretation; empirically defined facts gradually became more
important or superseded facts drawn from judicial introspection." RosmE, supra note 69, at 157.
90. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). As Rosen noted, "[T]he Court's use of social science in the Brown
case confirmed the success of efforts first made in the Muller case to have constitutional law
propounded in the light of reliable extra-legal data rather than of arbitrary judicial biases." Ro.
SEN, supra note 69, at 157.
91. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.ll.
92. Theodore Brameld, Educational Costs, in Disc n A1oNAM N AND NATIONAL WEL.FiAm 46
(Robert M. MacIver ed., 1949); KmNrn B. CLARK, EFEcr oF PRnuicE AND DISCRIMINATION
ON PERsONALrrY DEvEoPmmEN (White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); E.
FRANKLiN FRAziER, THE NEGRO IN Tm UNTED STATES 677 (rev. ed. 1957); HELEN LmAN
WrrNwmm & RurH KorNsKy, PERSONALrrY iN TE MAKiNG 6 (1952); Isidor Chein, What Are the
Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT'L. J. OpmnON
& ATrTrE REs. 229, 234 (1949); Max Deutscher & Isidor Chein, The Psychological Effects of
Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259, 265 (1948).
93. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Plessy Court employed the nineteenth century social theory of
Social Darwinism, which drew on the work of British sociologist and philosopher Herbert Spen-
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D. Social Science in the Modem Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court has received empirical social science
data on many occasions in the wake of Brown.94 Prominent examples in-
clude social science's role in decisions concerning school desegregation, 95
obscenity, 96 segregation by gender,9 7 jury size,98 discriminatory death pen-
cer. Social Darwinists believed that biological differences between individuals and groups re-
quired social inequality to maximize the "survival of the fittest." See ROBERT MCCLOSKmY, TEM
AmmRCAN StnRnmim CoURT 129 (1960) (arguing that the Court of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century "was being deluged by a potpourri composed of Social Darwinist philosophy
about the survival of the fittest and the virtues of economic freedom"). See generally IUcHARD
HoFSTADTER, SociAL DARwimNsM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (rev. ed. 1966) (offering historical
overview of social Darwinist thought).
94. Ronald Roesch et al., Social Science and the Courts: The Role of Amicus Curiae Briefs,
15 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 1, 1-5 (1991) (observing increased use and useliness of social science).
95. Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 36 (1971) (citing
race-related enrollment data).
96. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.1, 758 n.9 (1982) (citing case studies and
retrospective surveys of sexually exploited children). But see Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 57 n.7 (1973) (criticizing social science data contained in dissenting report of the 1970
Presidential Report on Obscenity and Pornography).
97. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Powell approvingly cites Wellesley President Newell's statement that "[t]he research we
have clearly demonstrates that women's colleges produce a disproportionate number of women
leaders and women in responsible positions in society." Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720 n.4 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The research of M. Elizabeth Tidball, e.g., M. Elizabeth Tidball, Perspective on Aca-
demic Women and Affirmative Action, 54 EDuc. Rec. 130 (1973), is frequently cited supporting
this proposition. E.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. Rv. 106,
138 (1986).
Professor Rhode critiqued the Court's use of Tidball's data to demonstrate the superiority of
women's colleges:
As a threshold matter, to view Who's Who listings as an adequate measure of achieve-
ment is to accept what many feminists have criticized as an impoverished understanding
of individual worth, an understanding that historically has devalued women's contribu-
tions. But even assuming arguendo that an entry in Who's Who is an appropriate indica-
tion of success, one cannot infer a causal relationship from a correlation without
controlling for a host of variables that Tidball's research failed to acknowledge. From
her data, it is impossible to separate the effects of single-sex schools from the higher
socioeconomic status and career orientation of their students. For example, had Ivy
League institutions been open to women during the period of Tidball's study, the per-
centage of achievers from coeducational schools might have been substantially different.
Id. at 139.
98. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101-02 n.48-49 (1970), the Court upheld a
six-person jury in a state criminal trial, based in part upon social science data. Michael Saks
argues that the Court misused empirical research on jury size. Michael J. Saks, Ignorance of
Science Is No Excuse, 10 TRILu 18, passim (NovJDec. 1974). Professor Hans Zeisel also criti-
cized the Court's misuse of research, arguing that the work presented "scant evidence by any
standards." Hans Zeisel .... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38
U. Cm. L. REv. 710, 715 (1974); accord MIcHAm J. SAKs, JURY Vmumrers 16-18 (1977); Hans
Zeisel & Sherry Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the Six-member Jury, 41 U. Cm.
L. REv. 281 (1974).
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alty, 9 death-qualified juries,"°° juvenile delinquency, 1' 1 discrimination,10 2
and Eighth Amendment death penalty challenges."0 3 Although social statis-
tics did not form the basis for any of these decisions, the Court has increas-
ingly engaged in consulting the social science literature, acknowledging
that "llegal theory is one thing. But the practicalities are different."' 4
Professors Grofman and Scarrow see progress in the Court's ability to prop-
erly utilize social science data on juries. They write that "[tihe use of so-
cial science by the Court ranged from abysmal in the first of the jury cases,
Williams v. Florida, to remarkably sophisticated in the Blackmun opinion"
in Ballew v. Georgia."5 The most extensive modem use of social science
99. Acker writes on the use of social science evidence in Supreme Court death penalty cases:
[E]ach of the five cases that dominated the Court's use of social science involved social
fact issues which made empirical evidence directly relevant or even essential to the
justices' case decisions. McCree [Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986)] forced the
Court to resolve whether the death qualification of jurors for the guilt-determination
phase of a capital trial produced conviction-prone juries and threatened the impartiality
and representativeness of the trial jury; McCleskey [v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)]
involved allegations that race discrimination systematically tainted the administration of
Georgia's capital punishment legislation; and Thompson [v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988)], Stanford [v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)], and Penry [v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989)] raised questions about the volitional control and the cognitive and
moral development of juveniles and the mentally retarded, and whether capital punish-
ment serves legitimate penological objectives when employed against such offenders.
Social science evidence naturally is most relevant to cases in which legal and empirical
issues are intertwined.
James R. Acker, Research on the Death Penalty: A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Em-
pirical Research Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986-1989, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REv.
65, 70 (1993); see also Constance R. Lindman, Sources of Judicial Distrust of Social Science
Evidence: A Comparison of Social Science and Jurisprudence, 64 IND. L.J. 755, 763 (1989) ("By
accepting the validity of the Baldus study [cited in death penalty case] unconditionally, the
Supreme Court protected the function of the jury in capital sentencing decisions.").
100. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168-173 (1986) (evaluating social science studies that
death-qualified juries violated constitutional rights of petitioner); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 517 (1968) (citing studies of juror attitudes toward capital punishment).
101. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 n.26 (1967) (citing studies of juvenile delinquency and
crime).
102. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340-41 (1977) (citing statistical studies in
proving discrimination). Statistical evidence frequently is used to prove disparate impact in racial
discrimination cases in the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, 1581
(11 th Cir. 1983), on pet.for reh'g and for reh'g en banc, 729 F.2d 1293 (1Ith Cir. 1984); Johnson
v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982). Reverse
discrimination claims may also be subjected to empirical social science analysis. See, e.g., Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
103. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-86 (1976) (presenting statistical studies on the de-
terrence value of the death penalty); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 348-53 (1972) (featuring
social science data on both sides).
104. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327, 332 (1945).
105. Bernard Grofman & Howard Scarrow, Mathematics, Social Science, and the Law, in THE
UsE, NoNusE, MisusE oF APPLiED SocrAL RESARca m THE Cours 117, 119 (Michael J. Saks &
Charles H. Baron eds., 1980) (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Ballew v. Georgia,
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evidence has been in death penalty cases decided by the Supreme Court in
the 1980s. Acker found:
The justices cited social science research evidence in 10 of the 28
death penalty cases (35.7%) decided between 1986 and 1989.
This represents far more regular use of social science than occurs
in criminal decisions generally: only 13.8% of a random sample
of 240 Supreme Court criminal cases decided between 1959 and
1988 cited one or more social science references. 10 6
The Court routinely receives social science information in amicus as well as
main briefs without subjecting it to quality control. 10 7
The Court might use more social science information if there were
more reliable research. Faigman observes that, "when finding constitu-
tional facts, the Justices often lament the absence of social science research
to aid them in their task."'0 8 For example, in Chandler v. Florida,10 9 the
Court complained that, despite assertions that broadcasting the proceedings
would interfere with the process of administering justice, "at present no one
has been able to present empirical data sufficient to establish that the mere
presence of the broadcast media inherently has an adverse effect on that
435 U.S. 223 (1978)). In Ballew, Justice Blackmun wrote that "recent empirical data suggests that
progressively smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group deliberation." 435 U.S. at 232.
The Court cited twenty-five empirical social science studies on the impact of jury size on convic-
tion in declaring the five-person criminal jury to be unconstitutional. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith
Greene, Twelve Angry People: The Collective Mind of the Jury, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1433
(1984) (book review).
106. Acker, supra note 99, at 69.
107. Acker argues that the Court lacks good sources of objective social science information.
He writes:
[Ihe justices alone should not be held accountable for social science research being
misused or ignored. In the absence of institutionalized procedures for the production
and evaluation of social fact information, appellate judges may be compelled to examine
social science evidence independently, if they are to make use of it at all. In the samples
of cases considered here, the vast majority of social science authorities cited in the
Court's decisions had been located through the justices' own efforts, rather than through
prior discussion in the briefs or otherwise.
James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases and Briefs: The Actual and
Potential Contribution of Social Scientists as Amici Curiae, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 25, 40
(1990).
108. The Justices writing in three cases could not "find much in the social science literature
either to help confirm or to cast doubt upon their judicial hunches about how juries deliberate
under different decisions rules:' Frederick C. Moss, Inside the Jury by Reid Hastie, Steven D.
Penrod and Nancy Pennington, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 840, 842 (1984) (book review) (citing
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)). See generally Faigman, supra note 7 (arguing that social science
is an important, although often overlooked, component of judicial decisionmaking).
109. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
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process."110 Similarly, in United States v. Leon,"' Justice Blackmun ac-
knowledged that the Court had inadequate empirical data on which to create
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule." 2 In Miranda v. Ari-
zona," 3 Justice White criticized the Court for ruling on the practical diffi-
culties of police interrogation without consulting empirical studies of police
procedure." 4 Similarly, Justice Harlan, writing for three Justices, charged
that "U]udged by any of the standards for empirical investigation utilized in
the social sciences, the factual basis for the Court's premise [about the co-
ercive nature of interrogation] is patently inadequate.""' 5
E. The Critique of Social Science in the Supreme Court
Many legal scholars and jurists have attacked the expanding use of
social science in constitutional decision-making as illegitimate." 6 For ex-
ample, Edmond Cahn supported the Brown decision, but feared that "we
may reach a point where we shall be entitled to equality under law only
when we can show that inequality has been or would be harmful."" 7 Simi-
larly, Judge Higginbottom expressed the fear that a reliance on statistical
110. Id. at 578.
111. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not
apply to evidence obtained by police officers who act in objectively reasonable reliance upon a
search warrant, even where the warrant is later found to be without probable cause).
112. Justice Blackmun wrote:
[A]ny empirical judgment about the effect of the exclusionary rule in a particular class
of cases necessarily is a provisional one.... If it should emerge from experience that,
contrary to our expectations, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule results in
a material change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we shall have to
reconsider what we have undertaken here. The logic of a decision that rests on untested
predictions about police conduct demands no less.
Id. at 928.
113. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
114. Justice White noted: "In sum, for all the Court's expanding on the menacing atmosphere
of police interrogation procedures, it has failed to supply any foundation for the conclusions it
draws." Id. at 536 (White, J., dissenting). The Court in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 n.5
(1979), acknowledged that "extensive empirical work has not been done" on the question of
assistance of counsel it was being asked to decide.
115. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 533 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
116. 'Tlhe Supreme Court.,. encountered severe criticism and opposition to its rulings on
desegregation of public schools, the exclusionary rule, and the retroactivity of its decisions, pre-
cisely because the Court relied on empirical generalizations." David M. O'Brien, The Seduction
of the Judiciary: Social Science and the Courts, 64 JutlcATnrU 8, 19 (1980); see also Brief for
Petitioner at 46-47, Lockhart v. McCree, 477 U.S. 816 (1985) (No. 84-1865) (charging that "[t]he
psychological and sociological studies in the record are 'pseudo-scientific"').
117. Cahn asked rhetorically: "If statistics, expert opinions, graphs, and similar data are suffi-
cient to establish that the legislative or administrative authorities have acted rationally, then is it
ever possible to prove that they have acted otherwise?" Edmond N. Cahn, Jurisprudence (Ameri-
can Survey), 30 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 150, 153-54 (1955).
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studies might usurp constitutional guarantees." 8 These critics fear that so-
cial science will become an excuse for judicial meddling in political
policy.1
9
Some decision makers are skeptical of social science evidence because
they suspect social scientists of using their craft as a smokescreen to cloak
their personal values with the label of objective science. 120 United States
Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, a former sociologist, charges that "social sci-
ence is rarely dispassionate .... [There is a distinct social and political
bias among social scientists."'' The research cited by the Court in Brown
has been attacked as an expression of the political values of the liberal com-
118. Judge Higginbotham wrote:
[Miore is afoot here, and this court is uncomfortable with its implications. This con-
cem has grown with the realization that the esoterics of econometrics and statistics
which both parties have required this court to judge have a centripetal dynamic of their
own. They push from the outside roles of tools for "judicial" decisions toward the core
of decision making itself. Stated more concretely: the precision-like mesh of numbers
tends to make fits of social problems when I intuitively doubt such fits. I remain wary
of the siren call of the numerical display and hope that here the resistance was adequate;
that the ultimate findings are the product of judgment, not calculation.
Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, 394 (N.D. Tex. 1980), modified in part, 521
F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Tex. 1981), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1073 (1984); see also Woolhandler, supra note 7, at 122-25 (surveying judicial criticisms of social
science and responses thereto).
119. For example, Judge William E. Doyle argued that Brown, as well as the school desegre-
gation cases that followed, was not actually based upon social data, but rather on normative princi-
ples such as "organic, moral, positive law and reason.' William E. Doyle, Can Social Science
Data Be Used in Judicial Decision-Making?, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 13, 17 (1977). Judge Doyle wrote,
"Constitutional law is not made from sociology and neither does a change in sociology affect the
decision." Id. at 18; see also Faigman, supra note 7, at 544 ("The Court often fails to distinguish
between normative principles and empirical propositions, analyzing empirical research as it might
arguments about the text or precedent." (citations omitted)). See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEmpUnGr oF AMERICA (1990) (arguing that liberal judges are destroying democracy by making
law under the guise of interpreting it).
120. See, e.g., Lamprecht v. F.C.C., 958 F.2d 382,415 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Mikva, C.J., dissent-
ing) (I have no doubt that a host of amici will submit 'a host of empirical evidence' to 'corrobo-
rate' Congress's judgment."); see also David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the
Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1081 (1989)
("The legal relevance of social science research simply cannot be divorced from its scientific
credibility.").
121. Daniel P. Moynihan, Social Science and the Courts, 54 Pun. INTERST 12, 19 (1979).
Moynihan observed that judges sometimes use social science evidence to legitimate their personal
social agenda:
Taking their lead from the Supreme Court, subordinate Federal courts began to resort to
social-science findings to guide all manner of decisions, especially in the still troubled
field of schooling, but extending to questions of tax policies, of institutional confine-
ment of tax policies, of institutional care, of crime and punishment, and a hitherto for-
bidding range of ethical issues.
Id. at 14; see also James S. Coleman, Intellectuals and Public Policy, in THE PUBLIC AND PUBLIc
PoLIcy: REFLEroNs ON Bi-CENTEaiA. AMERICA (Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs ed., 1976) (noting social science research is often not politically neutral).
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munity masquerading as social science. The Brown studies have been as-
sailed on methodological grounds"z and for selectively ignoring social
science data finding that no harm results from segregation."
Some commentators propose that extra-record social science evidence
should be admissible to prove only legislative facts, not adjudicative
ones.' 24 Under this proposal, statistical analysis could be used to show un-
disputed facts,'2 5 but not to state what the law should be in a given situa-
122. A leading social scientific methodology text notes that "[i]t is only by understanding the
method and seeing how it was employed in a given study that you can determine if the possible
weaknesses were adequately controlled for." JEFFREY KArzEI a-r EA.., EVALUATNO INFORMATION:
A GUIME FoR USERS OF SocLAL SciENCE RESEARCH 15 (1978).
The methodology, interpretation, and validity of the social science evidence presented in
Brown have been sources of controversy among social scientists. See, e.g., Stuart Cook, Social
Science and School Desegregation: Did We Mislead the Supreme Court?, 5 PERSONALrFY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. BuLL. 420 (1979) (concluding that the research in the 1954 Court statement was gener-
ally valid).
The "doll" study cited by the Court in Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,
494 (1954), was performed by Kenneth and Mamie Clark in 1940. Kenneth B. Clark & Man-ie
Clark, Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children, in READINGs IN SociAL PsYCHoL-
OGY 169-178 (Theodore M. Newcomb et. al. eds., 1947). The study showed that black children
presented with identical black and white dolls thought of the white doll as "nice," and the black
doll as the one "that looks bad," id., and thus implied that black students had low self-esteem and
thought of themselves as inferior.
Professor Ernest van den Haag labels the Clark doll study "pseudo-scientific 'proof."' Er-
nest van den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases: A Reply to Professor
Kenneth Clark, 6 Vr.m.. L. REv. 69, 69 (1960). Professor van den Haag went so far as to accuse
the leading social scientists presenting data to the Court of fraud, charging that, "whatever evi-
dence appears in the body of the report... has been largely faked." ROSEN, supra note 69, at 190.
123. One legal academic wrote that social science tends "to support racial separation in the
schools, at least throughout adolescence." A. James Gregor, The Law, Social Science and School
Segregation: An Assessment, 14 W. RES. L. Rv. 621, 623 (1963); see also Monroe Berger, De-
segregation, Law, and Social Science, 23 ComMENTARY 471, 476 (1957) (arguing that the Court
did not base its decision on the harmful effects of segregation but on its inherent inequality).
124. Kenneth Culp Davis defined "legislative facts" as general background information rele-
vant to deciding questions of law and policy. Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of
Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REv. 364, 402, 407-09 (1942); accord KEN-
Nurm C. DAvis, A 1ThmmsTRAAnv LAW TPEAn-sE § 15.1 (2d ed. 1980); Kenneth C. Davis, Facts in
Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1980); Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L.
REv. 945 (1955). Adjudicative facts, in contrast, are relevant only to the case at hand and must
have met the rules of evidence to be included in the record. Davis, supra at 402, 411.
Paul Rosen explains the difference between adjudicative and legislative facts similarly:
There are basically two legal categories of facts within constitutional law: adjudicative
facts and legislative facts. The Supreme Court had always been concerned with facts,
but primarily with adjudicative facts. Adjudicative facts describe what has happened in
a particular case, and they ae usually established by a jury.... [LNegislative facts are
in effect a legal synonym for sociological analysis.
RosEN, supra note 69, at 53.
125. One compromise to the use of social science evidence in constitutional fact-finding is to
use empirical research for "middle range" legal issues. One social science researcher writes,
"Middle range legal issues fall somewhere between constitutional values too fundamental for so-
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tion. 126 This limitation would, in theory, keep researchers from introducing
their personal beliefs as scientific findings. However, the proposal may be
impractical because there is no clear line between the two types of facts. 27
F. The Tension Between Law and Social Science
The Court has been criticized for failing to use social science appropri-
ately. Two researchers describe the use of empirical social science studies
in constitutional decision-making as "cautious at best and uninformed at
worst; the nonuse and misuse of statistics have been more common than its
use." 128 The dearth of social science research data in constitutional deci-
sion-making may be attributed partially to the different paradigmatic as-
sumptions of legal practitioners and social scientists.
Lawyers and social scientists have dramatically different professional
socialization and disparate ethical codes.'2 9 Social science employs an ana-
cial science to question and mundane premises not requiring scientific confirmation." Reid Has-
tie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire An Effective Procedure for the Selection of Impartial
Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 703, 703 n.1 (1991) (citation omitted).
126. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977) (stating that
statistics cannot determine what the law should be in constitutional decision-making); cf. Spencer
v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, 1581 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[W]hile statistics alone usually cannot establish
intentional discrimination, under certain limited circumstances they might.").
127. Professors Monahan and Walker argue that the legislative/adjudicative fact distinction is
a false dichotomy because it perpetuates the legal formalist bifurcation between "fact and law."
They write:
[Davis] left the classification of empirical information as fact, and merely divided the
category of fact into two subcategories, one of which (legislative) reflected the Realist
position that judges make law. The procedural ramifications emanating from Davis's
tacit acceptance of the manner in which classical jurisprudence separated fact and law
have been limited to the largely negative proposal that facts used to create a rule of law
are not to be treated as other facts are treated in court. This view fails to provide clear
direction regarding how courts should obtain social science data and contains no infor-
mation about how courts should evaluate what they have obtained, or what effect they
should give to the evaluation of other courts.
Monahan & Walker, supra note 4, at 485. For other critiques of the legislative/adjudicative dis-
tinction, see Thomas McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolu-
tion of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. LJ. 729,
767 (1979).
128. DAvID W. BARNs & JoHN M. Com.EY, STArIsrIcAL EviDENcE rN LITIGATION 3-4
(1986).
129. Partisanship, advocacy and the "fight theory" of justice are emblematic of the American
legal system. E.g., MARviN E. STEPHAN, TiE ADVERsARY SYsTEm: A DESCRIPTION AND DE-
FENSr 3 (1984); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 40 AM. L. Rv. 729, 738-40 (1906). But see Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the
Evaluation of the Adversary System, 64 IND. LJ. 301, 302 (1989) (arguing that there are modem
trends away from adversarial ideologies in law). The contrasts are manifest: social scientists are
inductive while lawyers are deductive; social science is empirical while law is doctrinal; social
scientists focus upon patterns of behavior and long-term probabilities while lawyers care about
winning their individual cases, not long-term patterns. See generally William Simon, The Ideol-
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lytical and empirical approach to research problems. The goals of social
research are
1) [to gain] familiarity with phenomenon or to achieve new in-
sight into it ... [;] 2) to portray accurately the characteristics of
particular phenomena... [;] 3) to determine the frequency with
which something occurs or is associated with something else; and
4) to test a hypothesis of a causal relationship between
variables. 130
In contrast, lawyers subscribe to the fight theory, which holds that the pri-
mary goal is to organize facts in the manner most beneficial to the client.131
Professor William Simon describes the lawyer's value system as an
"Ideology of Advocacy." 32 lHe explains:
The purpose of the Ideology of Advocacy is to rationalize the
most salient aspect of the lawyer's peculiar ethical orientation:
his explicit refusal to be bound by personal and social norms
which he considers binding on others.... Doctrinal writings on
legal ethics and judicial procedure often takes the form of a de-
bate between the partisans of a "battle" model and the partisans of
a "truth" model of adjudication. 33
Michael Saks argues that social scientists experience a "role conflict"
when they file amicus briefs because of the difficulty of reconciling the two
normative codes. 134 He differentiates between a "guild brief," described as
ogy of Advocacy, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 75 (arguing that the neutrality of the lawyer is rational-
ized based on long-term results, but, in the end, ideology is outweighed by function). Social
scientists are socialized in graduate schools to conduct research according to the norms of scien-
tific research--objectivity, verifiability and value-neutrality. Indeed, lawyers are socialized-and
ethically required-to be zealous advocates. ROBERT GRANFmLD, THE MAKINO OF EUm LAW.
YERS: VIsioNs OF LAW AT HARVARD AN BEYOND 460 (1992); see also David Luban, Calming
the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L. REv. 451,460
(1981) ("[A] lawyer engages in the practice because not to do so would put him at a disadvantage
relative to other lawyers who do").
130. CLAIRE SELLrrz Er AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN SocIAL RE.ATnONs 50 (1965).
131. JERoME FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL 80 (1949); accord Simon, supra note 129, at 30;
David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in Tim GOOD LAWYER 83 (David Luban ed. 1983).
132. Lawyers are socialized to adhere to the principle of neutrality from his client's ends and
partisanship through legal education, legal professional ethics, and doctrinal writings. Simon,
supra note 129, at 31-32. Professor Simon argues that "[t]he principles of neutrality and partisan-
ship describe the basic conduct and attitudes of professional advocacy. The two principles are
often combined in the terms 'adversary advocacy' or 'partisan advocacy."' Id. at 37.
133. Id. at 30-31.
134. Saks writes:
The advocate's duty is to advance the most persuasive evidence and arguments on be-
half of a client that can be done without perpetrating a fraud on the court. Presenting
"biased" arguments and evidence in this endeavor not only is permitted, it generally is
ethically required. That is part of what it means to be an advocate. By contrast, the
scientist's responsibility normally is to share with students, colleagues, and the public
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a partisan amicus brief that quotes scientific findings in the interests of a
party, and a "science translation brief," which is a disinterested summation
of research in the field.135 Ironically, the science translation briefs are more
controversial because neutrality is so difficult to achieve.' 36 Less criticism
has been directed toward the targets of this Article, those who selectively
distort social science findings for clearly partisan purposes. In the follow-
ing section, we use the guild briefs submitted by the petitioners in three
recent Supreme Court punitive damages cases to illustrate this
phenomenon.
III. JuNK SocIAL. SCmNCE: A CASE STUDy OF PuNrnvE DAMAGES
A. Punitive Damages Amici Before the Court
Punitive damages is the Beirut of American legal remedies. The
schism over punitive damages lines up both for and against the contention
that the remedy is creating a crisis for American business.'3 7 The "war"
over punitive damages pits plaintiffs' lawyers against the defense bar and
consumer advocates against corporatists.
13 8
(including courts) a complete, balanced, and accurate portrayal of the relevant
knowledge.
Saks, supra note 13, at 237-38.
135. Saks notes that it has been the American Psychological Association's "effort in the area
of public interest, science translation briefs, that has drawn the most substantive criticism. Guild
briefs, which assert conclusions about the practice or science of psychology, are at least as likely
to be imperfect reflections of the knowledge base, yet these have largely escaped criticism." Saks,
supra note 13, at 235.
136. Id.
137. Reforming punitive damages in products liability remains a top legislative priority for
much of the corporate community. Stacy Gordon, Work Comp Problems, Health Care Costs
Worry Risk Managers, Bus. INs., March 30, 1992, at I (reporting that "[for the second consecu-
tive year, caps on punitive damages and/or non-economic damages was the single most important
issue to the corporate risk managers"). A survey of 500 chief executive officers of U.S. corpora-
tions uncovered a widespread desire for tort reform because "product-liability issues have become
a pervasive force in many corporate boardrooms, distorting planning, sapping top management's
time and consuming company resources." Magaly Olivero, What You Should Know About the
Product-Liability Crisis: Managers' Shoptalk, WoRKNG WoMAN, Nov. 1988, at 31-32.
138. Numerous business interests have combined in every state to limit the remedy of punitive
damages. For example, the Product Liability Coordinating Committee (PLCC) was formed in
1987 to coordinate the activities of eight organizations: The American Tort Reform Association
(ATRA), the Product Liability Alliance, the Business Roundtable, the United States Chamber of
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chemical Manufacturers Association,
the Coalition for Uniform Product Liability Laws, and the National Federation of Independent
Businesses. ATRA-sponsored state groups have introduced comprehensive tort reform legislation
scaling back punitive damages in a number of states. Michael Bradfor, Tort Reform Proponents
See Boost From Bush Plan, Bus. INs., February 17, 1992, at 2. ("ATRA will be heading back to
20 state legislatures in an effort to protect tort reform gains in recent years or fight bills that would
expand liability.").
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The abuses of social science data in the amici briefs of three recent
Supreme Court punitive damages cases 13 9 illustrate how zealous advocates
can create misperceptions. The amici on both sides of the punitive damages
debate use social science data to show that punitive damages are either a
"crisis created by runaway jury awards or [a] mirage manufactured by a
well-heeled corporate public relations campaign."' 140 Competing social sci-
ence claims are central to the war over punitive damages fought in amici
briefs. In the words of one commentator, "With much slinging of studies
and figures, both sides have alternatively proclaimed that punitive awards
either are skyrocketing or are being held in check."'' In this section, we
show how amici have misused the available social science data on punitive
damages through misleading and out-of-context depictions. The discussion
focuses on the most recent Supreme Court ruling on punitive damages, TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,'42 although the slanted use
of social statistics is quite similar to the techniques employed by amici in
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 143 and
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993), amici
representing
the nation's business community-from Allstate Insurance Co. to the Monsanto Co...
argue that [punitive damages] ... continue to run wild and there is a need for specific
standards. Their opponents, including the Center for Auto Safety and the Consumer
Federation of America counter that most states have moved to modify their statute....
[I]f more reform is needed.. .[,] it should be left to the political process.
Marcia Coyle, Punitives at Issue, Yet Again, Justices Examine Either "Mirage" or "Crisis",
NAT'L L.J., March 29, 1993, at 1. The article reports the sharply divided amici teams in TXO.
Petitioners "drew amicus backup from longtime punitives opponents Theodore R. Olson ...
Victor E. Schwartz, & former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold." Id. at 38. Respondents have
"attracted formidable support, including Professor Rustad, Arthur H. Bryant of Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice, Leslie A. Brueckner and David G. Vladek of Public Citizen Litigation Group and
27 state attorneys general." Id.
139. The constitutionality of punitive damages was first considered in 1988. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988). The Court refused to review an insurer's claim
that a punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
ruling that the defendant did not properly raise those claims in the lower court. Id. at 76-80.
However, several of the Justices indicated that they would revisit the due process issue if a proper
case arose. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, invited a substantive due process challenge
to punitive damages, stating: "In my view, because of the punitive character of such awards, there
is reason to think that this may violate the due process clause .... This due process question,
serious as it is, should not be decided today." Id. at 87-88.
140. Coyle, supra note 138, at 1.
141. Debra C. Moss, The Punitive Thunderbolt: How Much Should Courts Curb Extraordi-
nary Awards?, A.B.A. J. May 1993, at 88.
142. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
143. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). Each side in Browning-Ferris presented the factual evidence as
advocates for one side and not as science translation experts. For example, the petitioner in
Browning-Ferris argued: "Multi-million dollar awards of punitive damages, while essentially un-
precedented 20 years ago and still a rarity a decade ago, have today become commonplace."
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Browning-Ferris, 488 U.S. 980 (1989) (No. 88-556) (citations
1993] JUNK SOCIAL SCIENCE
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co v. Haslip.14 "Friends of the Court" oper-
omitted). The petitioner cited "[a] study commissioned by the Institute for Civil Justice of the
RAND Corporation, law reports and even the daily newspaper as evidence of the proliferation of
multi-million dollar punitive damage awards. Id. at 11, n.20. The petitioner concluded that
"something is seriously wrong with the system of awarding punitive damages." Id. at 10.
The Petitioner's Brief argued further that "it has become common for punitive damages
awards of millions of dollars-and in some instances tens of millions of dollars or more-to be
returned by juries and upheld by courts." Id. The Petitioner also cited the work of Peter Huber to
support its hypothesis that punitive damages "simply reflect the size of the defendant's pocket-
book." Id. at 11 (citing PmR HutEa, Lmi..rry: THE I GAL REVoLUTON AND Tm CONSE
QUEN CEs 119 (1988)).
The Petitioner retorted that "punitive damages have gone wild but it is the tip of an iceberg
with which the American legal system is increasingly colliding." Reply Brief for the Petitioners,
at 10, Browning-Ferris (No. 88-556). The Red Cross amici brief supporting the petitioner in
Browning-Ferris argued that "[tihe frequency and size of punitive damage awards have exploded
in recent years." Brief of the American National Red Cross, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, at 16, Browning-Ferris (No. 88-556). The brief employed anecdotal evidence as well
as extensive citations to the RAND study, see infra note 167, of a quarter century of punitive
damage verdicts in Cook County, Illinois and San Francisco County, California. The brief ar-
gues that there is a "'drastic,' 'mind-boggling,' 'explosive,' increase in the frequency and severity
of awards." Brief of the American National Red Cross, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, at 20, Browning-Ferris (No. 88-556).
This picture of punitive damage awards veering out of control was rebutted by a sharply
different view of the social science empirical research presented by the respondent. The Respon-
dent's Brief cited a study noting "empirical evidence suggesting that any increase in the size or
frequency of punitive damages has been limited to a few geographical areas." Brief for Respon-
dents, On Writ of Certiorari at 27, Browning-Ferris (No. 88-556). The Brief also cited an Ameri-
can Bar Association Special Committee Report. "(11n the two jurisdictions it studied, one-half of
the punitive damages awards below $50,000 were reduced through judicial review or settlement,
as were 80% of those above $50,000; indeed, 'defendants paid in toto only 50% of the punitive
damages awarded at trial."' Id. at 28 (citing REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CormMrra ON PuNrrrvE
DAMAGES, SECTION OF LMGATION, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, PuNrrlvE DAMAGES: A CON-
sTRUC'aVE EXAMINATION (1986)).
The Respondents' amici also relied upon empirical evidence in repudiating the claim that
punitive damages have created a crisis requiring the Court's intervention. The Insurance Con-
sumer Action Network Brief in Support of the Appellees argued that "[p]unitive damage reme-
dies have been sparingly applied.' Brief of Insurance Consumer Network As Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellees, at 12, Browning-Ferris (No. 88-556).
144. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). The petitioner and respondent's amici made extensive use of empiri-
cal evidence in the Haslip briefs as well. The first volley of selected empirical studies was in
Appendix A to Pacific Mutual's Appellant's Brief. The appendix supported the argument that
punitive awards are increasing in frequency and amounts. Petitioner's Brief on Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Alabama, at app. a, Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1990) (No. 87-482).
The respondent, however, argued that the actual impact of punitive damages "cast doubt on
the wisdom of constitutionalizing procedural requirements for punitive damages awards." Re-
spondents' Brief in Opposition On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama, at 17-21, Haslip (No. 87-482). The respondents cited studies, GENERAL AccouNTrNG
OIFICE, PRODUCT LrABrrrY VEDicTs & CASE REsOLUTION IN FIv STATES (1989); REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL COMW1TrEE ON PUNIVE DAMAGES, supra note 143, that questioned "the factual
assumption that runaway juries are awarding punitive damages bearing no reasonable or predict-
able relationships to harm inflicted." Respondent's Brief in Opposition On Petition For Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama, at 17-18, Haslip (No. 87-482). The respondents
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ate as "Lobbyists of the Court" in all of these cases.
Ironically, the policy agenda of many of the amici writing in support of
TXO led these organizations to use social science research in a way that
undermined TXQ's case. TXQ's contention was that the uniqueness of the
ten million dollar punitive damages award demonstrated that an injustice
had been done. The amici argued, inaccurately, that empirical social sci-
ence studies prove that the award was just another illustration of the crisis
caused by frequent runaway punitive damages. 145
B. Amici Participation in the Punitive Damages Trilogy
The first case in the punitive damages trilogy was Browning-Ferris
Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. 46 There, the Court
contended that "[tihis body of information suggests that punitive damages pose no significant
social or legal problem." Id. at 18.
The petitioner's reply brief, however, noted the "frequency of remittiturs, after which the
awards are still staggering," Petitioner's Reply Brief On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Alabama, at 10, Haslip (No. 87-482), and argued that juries were not being
sufficiently restrained by existing legal protections.
145. Petitioner's Brief, at 15, TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2711 (1993) (No. 92-479). TXO's search failed to uncover a single case of a punitive damage
award upheld in West Virginia that was greater than $500,000, an amount less than 1/20 of their
award. Id. at 17.
The amici briefs in support of the petitioner appear to contradict the petitioner's claim that
punitive damages are rare. The petitioner's brief quoted Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin as
finding that "the median ratio of punitive damages to other damages ranges from one to four." Id.
at 31. When we read the petitioner's amici briefs, however, we found that many of them called on
the Supreme Court to overturn the punitive damage award in 7XO because this was just one
example of a remedy veering out of control. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Media Organiza-
tions in Support of Petitioner, TXO (No. 92-479) (noting a rise in libel punitive damage awards);
Amicus Curiae Brief for the Center for Claims Resolution in Support of Petitioner, TXO (No.
92-479) (observing an epidemic of punitive awards); Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Auto-
mobile Manufacturers Association in Support of Petitioner, TXO (No. 92-479) (arguing that puni-
tive damages are out of control).
146. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). In the 1989 term, the Supreme Court decided that the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment did not limit punitive damage awards, id. at 260, but again
declined to pass on the question of whether awards of punitive damages were reviewable under
the Due Process Clause. Id. at 260 n.1. The Court in Browning-Ferris upheld a six million dollar
punitive damages award against Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. (BFI), which had attempted to
monopolize the industrial-waste disposal business in Burlington, Vermont, through predatory pric-
ing. When a former employee, Joseph Kelley, founded Kelco and gained 43% of Burlington's
waste disposal business in only nine years, a top BFI official ordered his subordinates to "[plut
[Kelley] out of business. Do whatever it takes. Squish him like a bug." Id. at 260. In attempting
to destroy Kelco, BFI violated federal antitrust and Vermont state law. Id. at 261.
The jury awarded Kelco $51,146 in compensatory damages and six million dollars in puni-
tive damages. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed the verdict, noting that punitive damages were
justified because BFI had "wilfully and deliberately attempted to drive Kelco out of the market."
Id. at 262. In its petition for a writ of certiorari, BFI asked the Court to consider whether this
punitive damages award violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines.
The Excessive Fines Clause had never been applied in civil lawsuits between private parties, but
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ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment' 47 did not
limit punitive damage awards. Still, the Court declined to pass on the ques-
tion of whether awards of punitive damages were reviewable under the Due
Process Clause.' 48  Later, the Court conducted a procedural due process
examination of punitive awards in the 1991 Haslip case.' 4 9 Finally, in
BFI presented a novel argument. BFI asserted that the clause "derives from limitations in English
law on monetary penalties exacted in private civil cases to punish and deter misconduct." Id. at
268.
BFI's position was based on the fact that the Magna Carta prohibited excessive fines imposed
by the King. The money from these amercements went into the King's treasury, giving him an
incentive to assess unfairly large fines. Id. at 269-70. BFI argued that, since punitive damage
verdicts are fines designed to punish bad behavior, they are functionally equivalent to amerce-
ments. Id. at 268. It is irrelevant, the corporation asserted, that the large fine was levied by a civil
jury rather than by the state and went to the wronged individual rather than to the government. Id.
at 259.
The Supreme Court rejected BFI's contentions, holding, "on the basis of the history and
purpose of the Eighth Amendment, that its Excessive Fines Clauses does not apply to awards of
punitive damages in cases between private parties." Id. at 260. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, found the meaning of "fine" as used in the Eighth Amendment to be "a payment to a
sovereign as punishment for some offense" and therefore not applicable to lawsuits between pri-
vate parties. Id. at 265.
A second argument made by BFI was that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment limits the jury's discretion in awarding punitive damage awards. The question of 'Jury
discretion to award punitive damages in the absence of any express statutory limit," the Court
stated, was an inquiry that "must await another day." Id. at 277.
147. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. See gener-
ally Lydon F. Bittie, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: An Analytical Framework for
Determining Excessiveness, 75 CAL. L. Rnv. 1433, 1470 (1987) (arguing that the Eighth Amend-
ment's excessive fines clause should be held to limit state imposition of punitive damages in civil
actions); Donald S. Yaralo, Comment, Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.: The
Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages, 40 CAsE W. R.s. L. REv. 569, 580 (1990) (con-
sidering punitive damages under a constitutional analytical approach).
148. In Browning-Ferris, several of the Justices expressed concern about the indeterminate
nature of punitive damages. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, stated that the door was
left open "for a holding that the due process clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages
in civil cases brought by private parties." Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 280 (Brennan., J. concur-
ring). Justice Brennan stated further that the jury instructions were so vague as to be "scarcely
better than no guidance at all.... The point is... that the instruction reveals a deeper flaw: the
fact that punitive damages are imposed by juries guided by little more than an admonition to do
what they think is best." Id. at 281.
Justice O'Connor contended that punitive damages have an adverse effect on the competitive
posture of the United States. Id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justices O'Connor and Ste-
vens, in partial dissent, observed that "[a]wards of punitive damages are skyrocketing.'? Id. at
282 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). The Court again rejected the
business community's invitation to restructure punitive damages. In Haslip, an insurance agent
secretly pocketed his clients' premiums rather than sending them to Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co., and he concealed from his "customers" the fact that his dishonesty had caused their policies
to lapse. Id. at 1036. Cleopatra Haslip, the principal plaintiff, learned of the agent's malfeasance
only after her hospital bill was rejected by the insurance company. Id. at 1036-37. After unsuc-
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TXO, 15 ° the Court determined that a punitive damages award of $10 million
did not violate a corporate defendant's procedural and substantive due pro-
cess rights, even though there were only $19,000 in actual damages. 151
cessfully attempting to resolve the matter, she and her co-employees sued both the dishonest agent
and Pacific Mutual. Id. at 1036. The jury returned a general verdict of $1,040,000 for Haslip,
including a compensatory damages award of $200,000 and out-of-pocket expenditures of less than
$4,000. Id. at 1037.
An Alabama jury found that, since the insurance agent "was acting as an employee of Pacific
Mutual when he defrauded [the] respondents," the company was liable. Id. at 1040. The Court
affirmed the punitive damage award on a 7-1 vote. Id. at 1036. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, rejected Pacific Mutual's argument that as a fellow victim it should not be assessed
punitive damages. He argued, "Imposing exemplary damages on the corporation when its agent
commits intentional fraud creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those in a position 'to guard
substantially against the evil to be prevented."' Id. at 1041 (quoting Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co.
v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927)).
The Court examined Alabama's method of assessing punitive damages and determined that
its scheme of awarding punitive damages satisfied due process. Id. at 1043. The Court stated that,
"due process imposes some limits on jury awards of punitive damages, and it is not disputed that a
jury award may not be upheld if it was the product of bias and passion, or if it was reached in
proceedings lacking the basic elements of fundamental fairness." Id. at 1038 (quoting Brown-
ing-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276). The Court determined that the jury instructions, trial court, and
appellate review ensured against due process violations. Id. An award of punitive damages must
not be "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense and must have some understandable
relationship to compensatory damages," as well as reflect "objective criteria." Id. at 1045-46. The
Court tacitly recognized empirical studies in its recognition that "unlimited jury discretion-or
unlimited judicial discretion for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme
results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities." Id. at 1043. In Haslip, Justice Blackmun ob-
served that a punitive award of four times compensatory damages was "close to the [constitu-
tional] line." Id. at 1046. "Due process may not require a detailed roadmap, but it certainly
requires directions of some sort." Id. at 1059 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993). In 7XO, the
punitive damages award arose out of the defendant's oil and gas exploration activities in West
Virginia. TXO, a Texas oil and gas production company, acquired Alliance's lease interest in a
tract of land in McDowell County to explore for oil. Id. at 2715. TXO filed a quitclaim deed
attempting to gain rights in the disputed land. Id. TXO's ostensible reason for filing a declaratory
judgment regarding the tract was to clear title. Id. at 2715 n.5. Alliance counterclaimed for slan-
der of title arguing that TXO's declaratory judgment action was actually a ploy to steal royalties.
Id. at 2716.
The West Virginia Supreme Court found TXO's declaratory judgment was an attempt to use
the purported cloud on the title as leverage for increasing its profits from oil and gas rights. TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 877 (W. Va. 1992), affd, 113 S.
Ct. 2711 (1993). The West Virginia Supreme Court found that "TXO knowingly and intentionally
brought a frivolous declaratory judgment action" against the appellees to clear title. Id. at 875.
The West Virginia court found that TXO's conduct was sufficiently malicious to warrant a ten
million dollar punitive damage award. Id. The West Virginia court found that TXO's actions
showed "that this was not an isolated incident on TXO's part-a mere excess of zeal by poorly
supervised, low-level employees-but rather part of a pattern and practice by TXO to defraud and
coerce those in positions of unequal bargaining power vis-a-vis TXO's superior legal firepower."
Id. at 881 (italics in original).
151. The court rejected TXO's argument that its due process rights were violated and upheld
the award. The West Virginia court found that the award satisfied "broad, general guidelines
concerning whether punitive damages bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages." Id. at
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In the lower court decision, West Virginia Supreme Court Justice
Richard Neeley performed a small social science study to determine which
punitive damage awards were likely to be upheld on appeal.' 52 Justice Nee-
ley focused on the relationship between compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. He found that punitive awards with high ratios were correlated with
intentional, deliberate and malicious wrongdoing. 5 3 "Really mean" de-
fendants, who set out to deliberately injure plaintiffs, received the greatest
punishment. Merely "stupid" defendants received a more sympathetic hear-
ing from appellate courts because their actions were careless, rather than
mean-spirited.154 Justice Neeley reasoned that TXO's actions were
mean-spirited and, therefore, the large punitive award was justified.' 55
Several organizations filed amicus briefs on both sides of these three
cases. In Browning-Ferris, the Court received sixteen briefs from
organizations 5 6  supporting the petitioner and six in support of
887. The court affirmed the ten million dollar punitive damages award, rejecting the defendant's
contention that a punitive award 526 times the size of the actual damages violated due process. Id.
at 890. The United States Supreme Court, in a six to three opinion, affirmed the West Virginia
Supreme Court's decision. TXO, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
152. TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 887.
153. Id. at 888 n.11.
154. Id. at 888.
155. TXO maliciously plotted "to use the [quitclaim] as leverage for increasing its interest in
the oil and gas rights." Id. at 887. Under West Virginia law, "[w]here the defendant is not just
stupid, but really mean... even punitive damages 500 times greater than compensatory damages
are not per se unconstitutional." Id. at 889.
156. Numerous business, trade association, insurance and civic organizations submitted ami-
cus curiae briefs for the petitioner in Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257 (1989): Amicus Curiae Brief of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the
United States, Inc., Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., and National Association of Manu-
facturers of the United States; Amicus Curiae Brief of Alliance of American Insurers, the Ameri-
can Council of Life Insurance, The American Insurance Association, the Health Insurance
Association of America, and the National Association of Independent Insurers; Amicus Curiae
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the National Association of Manufactur-
ers, the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the American Corporate Counsel Association;
Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies; Amicus Curiae
Brief of the Defense Research Institute; Amicus Curiae Brief of the City of New York; Amicus
Curiae Brief of the American National Red Cross, the American Tort Reform Association, the
Association for California Tort Reform, the Council of Community Blocd Centers, General Elec-
tric Company, the Merchandising Group of Sears, Roebuck and Company and the Texas Civil
Justice League; Amicus Curiae Brief of Arthur Andersen & Co., Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte &
Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Price Waterhouse; Amicus Curiae Brief of
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., and Shear-
son Lehman Hutton Inc.; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company; Ami-
cus Curiae Brief of Metromedia, Inc.; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Asso-
ciation of the United States, Inc., the Business Roundtable, American Corporate Counsel Associa-
tion, Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc., Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., and
the Product Liability Alliance; Amicus Curiae Brief of Bethlehem Steel Corporation and Atlantic
Legal Foundation; Amicus Curiae Brief of Golden Rule Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance
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respondent.157 The petitioners and their amici used social science evidence
to argue that the punitive damages award was excessive under the Eighth
Amendment.' 58 In Haslip, twenty-five amici briefs supported the peti-
tioner159 and seven briefs supported the respondent.' 60 The petitioner and
Company, and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association and the American Medical Association; Amicus Curiae Brief of Navis-
tar International; and Amicus Curiae Brief of Mutual Insurance Companies.
157. Consumer groups and trial lawyers submitted amicus curiae briefs for the respondent in
Browning-Ferris: Amicus Curiae Brief of National Insurance Consumer Action Network; Ami-
cus Curiae Brief of California Trial Lawyers Association; Amicus Curiae Brief of Association of
Trial Lawyers of America; Amicus Curiae Brief of Consumers Union of U.S., Consumer Federa-
tion of America, National Consumers League, National Women's Health Network, Center for
Science in the Public Interest, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice, and Women's Equity Action League; and Amicus Curiae Brief for Martha Hoffman
Sanders.
158. E.g., Amicus Curiae Brief for the American National Red Cross, the American Tort Re-
form Association, the Association for California Tort Reform, the Council of Community Blood
Centers, General Electric Company, the Merchandising Group of Sears, Roebuck and Company
and the Texas Civil Justice League in Support of Petitioner, Browning-Ferris (No. 88-556); cf.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 30, Browning-Ferris (No. 88-556) ("[S]omething is seriously
wrong with the system for awarding punitive damages. With increasing frequency in recent
years, juries have handed huge windfalls to plaintiffs").
159. As in Browning-Ferris, numerous business, trade association, insurance, civic organiza-
tions and religious organizations submitted amicus curiae briefs for the petitioner in Pacific Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991): Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Council of Life
Insurance and Health Insurance Association of America; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, The National Association of Manufacturers, the Chemical Manu-
facturers Association and the American Corporate Counsel Association; Amicus Curiae Brief of
the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies; Amicus Curiae Brief of The Defense
Research Institute; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Alabama Defense Lawyers Association; Amicus
Curiae Brief of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and the American Medical Associ-
ation; Amicus Curiae Brief of the City of New York; Amicus Curiae Brief of Mid-America Legal
Foundation; Amicus Curiae Brief of Hospital Authority of Gwinnett County Georgia; Amicus
Curiae Brief of Business Roundtable and the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.; Amicus
Curiae Brief of the Association for California Tort Reform Association; Amicus Curiae Brief of
the Equal Employment Advisory Council; Amicus Curiae Brief of Arthur Andersen & Co.,
Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Price
Waterhouse; Amicus Curiae Brief of Church of Scientology of California; Amicus Curiae Brief of
Bethlehem Steel Corporation and Hercules Incorporated; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Washington
Legal Foundation, U.S. Representatives Joe Barton, Dan Burton, Hamilton Fish, Jr., Paul B.
Henry, Henry J. Hyde, and Thomas E. Petri, and The Allied Educational Foundation; Amicus
Curiae Brief of Alliance of American Insurers, The American Council of Life Insurance, The
American Insurance Association, The Health Insurance Association of America, and the National
Association of Independent Insurers; Amicus Curiae Brief of Claims Resolution; Amicus Curiae
Brief of The National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., The National Association of
Evangelicals, The Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, The Christian Legal Society,
The Coalition for Freedom, The Council on Religious Freedom, and the Unitarian Universalist
Association; Amicus Curiae Brief of CBS Inc., Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., Dow Jones & Company,
Inc., The Hearst Corporation, Knight-Ridder, Inc., National Broadcasting Company, Inc., Reuters
Information Services Inc., The Time Inc. Magazine Company, Tribune Company, United Press
International, Inc., The Washington Post, Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, The American
Society of Newspaper Editors, Association of American Publishers, Magazine Publishers of
1993] JUNK SOCIAL SCIENCE 127
its amici argued that an "explosion of punitive damages claims has (i) rap-
idly escalated both the number and the size of these awards, [and] (ii) ex-
panded the types of actions in which they are awarded, most notably into
contract cases.''
In TXO, amici submitted fifteen briefs supporting the petitioner 62 and
ten supporting the respondent.' 63 Five of the six empirical studies of the
America, Inc., National Association of Publishers, Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., National
Association of Broadcasters, Radio-Television News Directors Association, Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, and The Society of Professional Journalists; Amicus Curiae Brief of the
American Institute of Architects, The American Tort Reform Association, The Council of Com-
munity Blood Centers, General Electric Company, The Minnesota Civil Justice Coalition, The
National School Boards Association, and the Texas Civil Justice League; Amicus Curiae Brief of
Wholesaler-Distributors, N.M.T.B.A.-The Association for Manufacturing Technology, The Risk
and Insurance Management Society and The Product Liability Alliance; Amicus Curiae Brief of
Liability Insurance Underwriters; and Amicus Curiae Brief of Southeastern Legal Foundation.
160. Consumer groups, state attorneys general and trial lawyers submitted amicus curiae briefs
for the respondent in Haslip: Amicus Curiae Brief of California Trial Lawyers Association; Ami-
cus Curiae Brief of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice; Amicus Curiae Brief of Consumers Union of
U.S.; Amicus Curiae Brief of Association of Trial Lawyers of America; Anicus Curiae Brief of
the Attorneys General of Alabama, California and Texas; Amicus Curiae Brief of Alabama Trial
Lawyers Association; and Amicus Curiae Brief of National Insurance Consumer Organization.
161. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Haslip, (No. 89-1279).
162. As in Browning-Ferris and Haslip, numerous business, trade association, insurance, civic
organizations and religious organizations submitted anicus curiae briefs for the petitioner in TXO:
Amicus Curiae Brief For the American Council of Life Insurance, The Alliance of American
Insurers, The Association of California Life Insurance Companies, The Health Insurance Associa-
tion of America, and the National Association of Independent Insurers; Amicus Curiae Brief For
CBS Inc., Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., Dow Jones & Company, Inc., The Hearst Corporation,
Knight-Ridder, Inc., National Broadcasting Co., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., Reuters America,
Inc., Time Inc., Tribune Company, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., The American Society of
Newspaper Editors, Association of American Publishers, Magazine Publishers of America, Inc.,
National Association of Broadcasters, Newsletter Publishers Association, Inc., Newspaper Associ-
ation of American, Radio-Television News Directors Association, The Reporters Committee For
Freedom of the Press, and Society of Professional Journalists; Amicus Curiae Brief of Continental
Casualty Company; Amicus Curiae Brief of Arthur Anderson & Co., Coopers & Lybrand,
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Price Waterhouse; Amicus Curiae
Brief for the Center for Claims Resolution; Amicus Curiae Brief of Product Liability Advisory
Council, Inc.; Amicus Curiae Brief of The Securities Industry Association, Inc.; Amicus Curiae
Brief Church of Scientology of California; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Business Council of Ala-
bama; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation; Amicus Curiae Brief of
Owens-Illinois, Inc. and Texaco Inc.; Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Tort Reform Associ-
ation, The Association for California Tort Reform, The Alabama Civil Justice Reform Committee,
The Minnesota Civil Justice Coalition and The Texas Civil Justice League; Amicus Curiae Brief
of the Equal Employment Advisory Council; Amicus Curiae Brief for Phillips Petroleum Co.,
United Services Automobile Association and Allstate Insurance Co.; and Amicus Curiae Brief of
the American Automobile Manufacturers Association, American Insurance Association, American
Petroleum Institute, Business Roundtable, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Chemical
Manufacturers Association, and National Association of Manufacturers.
163. Consumer groups, state attorneys general and trial lawyers submitted the following Ani-
cus Curiae briefs for the respondent in TXO: Amicus Curiae Brief for Center for Auto Safety;
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Alabama Trial Lawyers Association; Amicus Curiae Brief of Univer-
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overall pattern of punitive damage awards in the United States were cited
by amici. Both sides in TXO quoted the same research in support of dia-
metrically opposed arguments.
C. The Use and Misuse of Social Science Data
The amici in these three cases presented empirical studies of punitive
damages award frequencies and size that varied radically depending on
whether the brief supported the petitioner or the respondents. We discov-
ered no outright fabrications in any of the briefs."6 Instead, we found a
systematic misuse of empirical research, a phenomenon we call "junk social
science." The social science evidence presented by the petitioners' amici
mirrors Huber's contention that "[t]he art of junk science is to brush away
just enough detail to reach desired conclusions, while preserving enough to
maintain the aura of authoritative science." 65 Junk social science is char-
acterized by quotes from social scientific research taken out of context, mis-
leading statistical presentations, denigration of studies whose results
conflicted with the argument, and anecdotes masquerading as social science
findings. This discovery led us, with the assistance of several other schol-
ars, to file our own brief in an effort to provide a neutral analysis of the
social science evidence.' 66
D. Five Empirical Studies of Punitive Damage Awards
Five empirical studies on the frequency, size, and post-trial adjustment
sity Scholars and Law Professors; Amicus Curiae Brief of Public Citizen; Amicus Curiae Brief of
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice; Amicus Curiae Brief of National Association of Securities and
Commercial Law Attorneys; Amicus Curiae Brief of Consumers Union of U.S. and Consumer
Federation of America; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Attorneys General of the States of Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia, and of The Common-
wealths of Kentucky and Pennsylvania; Amicus Curiae Brief of the West Virginia Trial Lawyers
Association; and the Amicus Curiae Brief of Association of Trial Lawyers of America.
164. The two most common canons of scientific veracity are validity and reliability. Validity
refers to the ability of a scientific test to measure what it is supposed to be measuring. Reliability
refers to the question of whether a given test obtains consistent results. See Paul C. Gianelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80
COLuM. L. REv. 1197, 1201 n.20 (1980). Professor Faigman states that "[r]eliability is the ulti-
mate legal concern, but when it hinges on controversial and contested reasoning, the validity of
that reasoning must be addressed." Faigman, supra note 120, at 1011 n.16 (quoting Bert Black, A
Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FoRDHm L. Rnv. 595, 599-600 (1988)). We have
doubts about both the validity and reliability of the social science data in the briefs submitted by
petitioners' amici in the punitive damages trilogy.
165. HuanR, supra note 28, at 157.
166. Amicus Curiae Brief of University Scholars and Law Professors in Support of Respon-
dents, TXO, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479).
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of punitive damage awards were cited by amici on both sides in TXO, alter-
natively illustrating that punitive damages are "skyrocketing" or rare.
These five empirical studies are:
(1) The RAND Institute for Civil Justice (RAND ICJ) study of
jury verdicts in two counties; 67
(2) The American Bar Foundation (ABF) study of jury verdicts
in eleven states; 168
(3) The GAO report on verdicts in five states in 1983-85;169
(4) Landes and Posner's (L & P) study of federal and state ap-
pellate cases published in West reporters; 170 and
(5) Rustad and Koenig's (R & K) study of a quarter century of
punitive damage verdicts in products liability.'
7 1
Table One outlines the years studied, the number of punitive damage
awards located, and brief descriptions of the samples used in these studies.
167. MARK A. PEmRSoN ETr AL., PuNT nvE DAMAGES: PRELImNARY EMPnucAL FNDiNs
(1987).
168. STEPHEN DANiELs & JOANNE MARTN, EMPmicAL PATTERNS IN PuNrrIVE DAMAGE
CASES: A DESCRIPTION OF INraDENcE RATES AND AwARDS (1988) [hereinafter DANiELS & MAR-
mN, EMPIRICAL PATrERNS]; Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Dam-
ages, 75 MNN. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter, Daniels and Martin, Myth and Reality].
169. UNrrED STATES GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCr LmBmrrY: VERnIcrs AND
CASE RE SOLUTION N FIVE STATES (1989).
170. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages, 10 REo. 33
(Sept/Oct. 1986).
171. MicHAEL RusTAD, DEmYsTiFyiNG PUNrrrVE DAMAGES IN PRODuCtS L1AamrrY CASES: A
SURVEY OF A QUARTER CmTUY OF TRIAL VERDIcrs (1991); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad,
The Quiet Revolution Revisited: An Empirical Study of the Impact of State Tort Reform of Punitive
Damages in Products Liability, 16 JUST. SYs. J. 21 (1993) [hereinafter Koenig & Rustad, The
Quiet Revolution Revisited]; Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Product Liabil-
ity: Testing Tort Anecdotes With Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REv. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Rustad,
In Defense of Punitive Damages]; Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity
of Punitive Damages: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 401 (1993) [hereinafter
Rustad & Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitve Damages]; Providing for a Uniform
Product Liability Law: Hearings on S. 640 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 146-152 (1991) (testimony of
Professors Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig); Product Liability: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Technology and Competitiveness of the Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, United
States House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 283-310, (1992) (testimony of Professors
Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad). The empirical findings from all of these works will be re-
ferred hereinafter as RUSTAD/KoENIG STUDY.
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TABLE ONE
EMPIRiCAL STUDIES OF PuNrmY VERDiUcrs IN
PRODUCrS LmITmrrY
STUDY YEARS # OF AWARDS LOCATION
1. RAND ICJ 172  1960-84 6 Cook County, Ill. &
San Francisco, Ca.
(State and Federal)
2. ABF 173  1981-85 34 47 sites in Az., Ca.,
Ga., I., Kan., Mo.,
N.Y., Ore., Tx, &
Wash.
3. GAO174  1983-85 23 Az., Mass., Mo.,
N.D., & S.C. (State
and Federal)
4. L & P175  1982-84 10 Published Federal &
State opinions in
West Reporters176
5. R & K 17 7  1965-90 355 Published and
Unpublished Federal
& State Cases
Nationwide
A recent article summarizing the punitive damage research reports that
"[a]lthough several studies have tracked punitive damages in selected juris-
dictions, there is little agreement on whether they prove there are many
runaway punitive damages verdicts. It's as if the two sides in the tort re-
form debate are looking at different parts of the same elephant." 178 How-
ever, a scholarly assessment of the research on punitive damages finds that
"every empirical study of the [punitive damages] question has reached con-
clusions that, to say the least, fail to support the claim that punitive damages
have grown dramatically in both frequency and size."'179 The latter assess-
172. PETERSON ET AL.., supra note 167, at 8-31.
173. DANm.s & MARTIN, EMPwRCAl. PATrERNs, supra note 168, at 28-43.
174. UNrrED STATES GENERAL AccouNTiNG OFncE, supra note 169.
175. Landes & Posner, supra note 170, at 33, 34-36.
176. Landes and Posner examined all federal products liability cases reported in the 10 most
recent volumes (at the time of their study) of the West Publishing Company's federal and regional
reporters. Id. at 34. By definition, the sample included cases where the punitive damage award
was appealed. California and New York cases were excluded from the analysis. Id. at 36.
177. RuSTAD/KOENIG SrY, supra note 171.
178. See Moss, supra note 141, at 91.
179. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System--and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. Rv. 1147, 1254 (1992).
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ment of the literature is the more accurate one.
All five of these studies come to the same conclusion despite the diver-
sity of their authorship and sponsorship. Their common finding is that pu-
nitive damages have been rarely awarded and even more rarely collected.'
To understand how this is possible, a more objective summary of the empir-
ical findings is necessary.
E. Findings of the Empirical Studies of Punitive Damages
1. RAND Institute for Civil Justice
RAND Corporation's study sampled 24,000 jury verdicts rendered be-
tween 1960 and 1984 in Cook County, Illinois and San Francisco County,
California.'' Between 1980 and 1984, 2.5 percent of the Cook County
trials and 8.3 percent of the verdicts handed down in San Francisco County
resulted in punitive damages."8 2 RAND's researchers, Mark Peterson,
Syam Sharma, and Michael Shanley, found that total jury awards increased
in both counties during the period studied.'8 3 The average product liability
award increased by forty percent in Cook County and tripled in San Fran-
cisco County. 1 84
There was a slight growth in the number of punitive damage awards
over this period. Cook County averaged only 1.8 punitive damage awards
per year during the 1960s and 1970s and 2.8 per year during 1980-84 for all
types of personal injury cases. 185 However, considering the small starting
base, there can be a huge increase in the proportion of cases resulting in
punitive damage awards without having much practical impact. For this
reason, the RAND study concluded that the punitive damages picture in
personal injury has changed very little in twenty-five years.' 8 6 The one
area of rapid growth came in the field of business torts such as insurance
180. Punitive damage awards may even be rarer in the field of medical malpractice. The
RAND Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice found only three punitive damage awards in mal-
practice cases in Cook County Illinois over a twenty-five year period. They uncovered only one
punitive award in medical malpractice cases in San Francisco County over the same period. Pa-
TERsoN ar AL., supra note 167, at 13 tbl. 2.5. Similarly, the American Bar Foundation found only
18 medical malpractice/punitive damage awards in 1,917 verdicts. This study encompassed 47
sites in 11 states between 1981 and 1985. Daniels & Martin, Myth and Reality, supra note 168, at
38, tbl. V. A February 1989 report surveying all medical malpractice claims filed in Minnesota,
North Dakota and South Dakota between January 1, 1982, and December 31, 1987, did not find a
single punitive damages award against a physician. STATE OF MmNEOrA, DaEr. OF COMwmRCE,
MEDICAL Mm.RAcncE CLAim STurDy: 1987-1989, at 22 (1990).
181. PErERsoN Er AL., supra note 167, at 4.
182. Id. at 9 tbl. 2.1.
183. Id. at 14.
184. Id. at 22.
185. Id. at 10 tbl. 2.3.
186. Id. at 12.
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bad faith, employment, and antitrust cases.18 7
Courts rarely awarded punitive damages in any type of case. Only
2.5% of the Cook County trials and only 8.3% of the San Francisco County
trials resulted in punitive damages. 188 RAND found only "four product lia-
bility cases in San Francisco and two in Cook County" during this
twenty-five year period.' 89 The median punitive damages award from 1980
to 1984 was $43,000 in Cook County and $63,000 in San Francisco
County.190
2. American Bar Foundation Study
Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, Senior Research Fellow and As-
sociate Director, respectively, of the American Bar Foundation (ABF) ex-
amined 25,627 jury verdicts handed down in state trial courts from 1981 to
1985,'9' a period that is probably the high water mark of punitive dam-
ages.' 92 The ABF compiled its data base from state jury verdict reporters in
forty-seven counties in eleven states.193 The sample was regionally bal-
anced in areas "of varying population sizes and socio-economic
make-ups."' 194
Daniels and Martin found no empirical support for the existence of a
punitive damages crisis. Contrary to the claims made by tort reformers,
they concluded that
[p]unitive damages were not routinely awarded. Nor were puni-
tive damages typically given in amounts that "boggle the mind."
Juries awarded punitive damages infrequently, and when they
were awarded, the amount was generally modest. ... The puni-
tive damages system that emerges from this study is significantly
different than the system described by the [tort] reformers, and
does not provide evidence of a nationwide problem. Thus, one
187. Id. at 22-25. Punitive damages in business/contract cases "changed greatly between
1960 and 1984. The sharp upward trends in both the number and amount of such awards reflected
in part the growing number of jury trials involving business tort or contract actions." Id. at 22.
188. Id. at 9 tbl. 2.1.
189. Id. at v.
190. Id. at 15 tbl. 2.7.
191. Daniels & Martin, Myth and Reality, supra note 168, at 28.
192. Cf. Eisenberg & Henderson, Jr., supra note 33, at 734 (noting that "[combining success
rate trends and award trends shows products liability in decline since 1985"); James A. Hender-
son, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of
Legal Change," 37 UCLA L. Rnv. 479, 499 (1990) (concluding that "[slince at least the
mid-1980s, published opinions have moved towards benefiting defendants over plaintiffs" in
products liability cases); Koenig & Rustad, The Quiet Revolution Revisited, supra note 171, at 37
fig. 6 (concluding that punitive damages have been declining since the mid-1980s).
193. Daniels & Martin, Myth and Reality, supra note 168, at 28-33.
194. Id. at 29.
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should view with skepticism the claims that juries routinely
awarded punitive damages... in large amounts, and that these
developments are nationwide in scope.
1 95
Generally, punitive damage awards were relatively small, although this
varied somewhat depending on location. The median punitive damages
award in jurisdictions having ten or more punitive damage awards ranged
from under $10,000 in some counties to as high as $204,000 in San Di-
ego. 9 Daniels and Martin's study found that only 4.9% of all verdicts
included punitive damages. 197 Of the 967 product liability verdicts, the
American Bar Foundation researchers uncovered only 34 cases in which
punitive damages were awarded.' 98
3. Government Accounting Office (GAO) Study
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) collected data on the fre-
quency and size of punitive damage awards in products liability cases be-
tween 1983 and 1985 for all such actions resolved through trial (305) in
Arizona, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Dakota, and South Carolina.199
The GAO also examined court records and conducted post-trial interviews
with attorneys. 2" The study found that punitive damage awards were
neither routine nor excessively large.2"' Post-trial appeals and settlements
substantially reduced the amounts collected in punitive damage awards.20 2
The GAO reached the same basic conclusions as did the other studies.
Courts awarded punitive damages infrequently (in only 23 of 305 cases-
7.5%), and these awards "were highly correlated (.71) [in size] with the
compensatory damages. 2 °3 These researchers found that "[t]he 23 puni-
tive damage awards had an average just under $1.3 million and a median of
$400,000, which are only slightly larger than the average and median com-
pensatory awards in those 23 cases (average of $906,000 and median of$375,000). '' °
4. Landes and Posner Study
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner examined all
195. Id. at 43.
196. Id. at 42.
197. Id. at 32 tUl. ii.
198. Id.
199. UN=raD STATES GENERAL AccoUNING OFmC, supra note 169, at 19-20.
200. Id. at 21.
201. Id. at 103 tbl. v.
202. Id. at 32.
203. Id. at 29.
204. Id.
1993]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
products liability cases "reported in the most recent volume of each of the
West Publishing Company's case reporters" and all "product liability cases
in the federal courts of appeals2"5 from the beginning of 1982 to November
1984." 20 They found that "[p]unitive damages were awarded in the [fed-
eral] trial court in 10 of the 172 cases.""2 7 In only three of the ten cases
was the award affirmed in whole. Appellate judges reversed six of the
cases and reduced the award in a seventh case.208 The authors concluded
that punitive damages were "relative[ly] insignifican[t]" in the substantive
area of products liability. °9
In short, these four studies uncovered a total of only sixty-three puni-
tive damage verdicts in products liability cases. Even within this small
number, there were undoubtedly duplications because the studies over-
lapped in time period and geographic location.210
5. Rustad and Koenig Study
To expand on the previous studies, we attempted to identify every
punitive damage award in products liability, thus examining the universe of
205. The authors took pains to note that the sample "is likely to be unrepresentative of the
universe of products liability cases-but unrepresentative in a direction that tends to bias our
estimate against the hypothesis that we test and reject: that punitive damages are being overused
in modem products liability law." WnaxiAM M. LmADS & RiCHARD A. PosMR, THE ECONOMIC
SmRucruRE OF TORT LAW 302 (1987). They explain further that:
The economic theory of litigation predicts that the cases most likely to be litigated and
appealed will be those where the law is most uncertain and where damages are largest.
This suggests that our sample will overstate the relative importance of punitive damages
in products liability cases; an award of punitive damages will increase the probability of
an appeal. Of course, if parties are highly risk averse, this would tend to raise the
settlement rate in cases where punitive damages are likely to be awarded if the case is
tried. But we have offered reasons for doubting the importance of risk aversion in the
products liability area.
Id. at 302-03.
206. Landes & Posner, supra note 170, at 34.
207. Id. at 35.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Not included is the computer-based statistical study by Professor Kip W. Viscusi, who
"identified 108 products liability cases from 1970 to 1989 in which punitive damages were
awarded and for which the final award actually received" was determined. See Kip W. Viscusi,
REFoRmiNG PRoDuCrs LLamrr 94 (1991). In Viscusi's study, plaintiffs received only 29% of
the original average awards of $2.5 million per case. His study is mentioned in the context of
another analysis and contains only a one paragraph description of his methodology, so exactly
what is in the sample is unclear. However, his findings are clearly in accord with those of all four
of the other studies.
1993] JUNK SOCIAL SCIENCE 135
cases.21' We searched all available computer-based statistical sources,2"
regional verdict reporters, 3 law reviews and other scholarly sources," 4
state products liability practice guides,2 15 generalized case-reporting serv-
211. The frequency of punitive damages in products liability cases is so low that focused
studies of single states do not yield enough awards to study patterns. For example, the New York
State Trial Lawyers Association (NYSTLA) recently conducted a review of punitive damage
awards in all tort areas in New York state from 1981 to 1991. The NYSTLA uncovered only three
punitive damage awards in products liability cases. The amount of punitive damages awarded, on
an annual basis, in all New York tort actions was as follows:
1981 $2,019,600
1982 $356,000
1983 $40,952,905
1984 $1,982,000
1985 $5,598,200
1986 $2,490,510
1987 $1,890,100
1988 $7,221,001
1989 $59,733,000
1990 $2,234,500
1991 $3,983,500
The single largest New York award in the decade was a $50 million punitive damages award
handed down in the Korean airline disaster in August of 1982, which killed 137 persons. In re
Korean Air Lines Disaster, 932 F.2d 1475, 1477 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 616 (1991).
The entire award was eliminated on appeal. Id. at 1484. The New York study concluded that
"punitive damage awards are highly unlikely to top 2-4 million dollars in any given year, and of
that it is likely that perhaps half will actually be collected." Memorandum to author from Gene
De Santis, New York State Trial Lawyer's Association, Inc. (March 30, 1992) (summarizing re-
view of punitive damage awards in New York State from 1981-91) (on file with author).
212. Our research team used hundreds of hours of WESTLAW, LEXIS and NEXIS con-
nect-time to locate verdicts that were not available in printed form. The American Trial Lawyers
Association Exchange (ATLA Exchange) conducted five separate computer-based runs on trial
and appellate cases. In addition to these sources, Louis Laska, President of the Judicial Advisory
Services of Louisville, Kentucky, performed a computer-based search of more than 3800 jury
verdicts (including, but not limited to, product liability cases) collected predominately in the
Southeastern states. Verdict Services conducted separate computer searches of Indiana, Montana,
New York, Ohio and Tennessee. Not only were many cases located not available through manual
searches, but these reports allowed information from other sources to be cross-checked for accu-
racy and completeness.
213. The search also included a large number of state verdict reporters published by private
organizations including: Cal.-JuRY VamDICTs WKLY. 1970 to present, covering all of Cal.; THE
GAvEL: CAL. JURY VERDicTs, 1973-89 (covering No. Cal., Haw. & Nev.); Colo.-JuRY VE DICT
REP. oF CoLO., 1983-present; D.CJBaltimore-MmRo VERDICTS MoNMLY, 1989-90; Fla.-FLA.
JURY Vamicr RaP., 1981-90; JuRy TRIALS & TPBULAIONS 1970-90; FLA. LAW WK., 1985-90;
Ga.-GA. TRIAL REP., 1987-90; Mich.-MicH. TRAL RaP., 1988-90; Mont.-MoNT. L. WK.
1980-90; New England states-NEw ENGLAND VERDicr REP. (Mass., Conn. & R.I.); N.Y.-N.Y.
JuRY VERDICT RaP.; Ohio-Omo TRIAL RP., 1987-90; Tenn-TEN. LMn. RaP.
214. We searched the LAWREV data base of Lexis for all references to punitive damage
cases. We also searched the Index to Legal Periodicals from 1960 to the present. We investigated
all citations to any punitive damage issue in product liability actions to determine whether an
award actually was made.
215. The following are a few of the state bar materials searched: JosEPH W. CATCHETr &
ROBERT CARawRIrHT, PRODUCTS LABn=IrY ACnON (rev. ed. 1975) (California); THoMAs E.
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ices, 2 16 court records,217 asbestos reporters, 2 18 and newspaper and magazine
reports.2 19 In addition, we surveyed all attorneys in reported cases,220 both
to locate further cases221 and to gain an in-depth understanding of the social
effects of this litigation.
Because there is no national reporting system, the actual number of
punitive damage verdicts in product liability actions is unknown and un-
knowable. The small number of awards uncovered, however, is consistent
with the prior research discussed herein. Post-trial developments generally
reduce punitive damage awards, particularly in cases with the largest
awards. It seems unlikely that such infrequent and well-controlled awards
could have a significant impact on American international competitiveness
or American business profits.
Punitive damage awards in products liability were quite rare, but not
unknown before the late 1960s.222 Only seven awards were identified in
BRiDGMAN, ILLINOIS PRODUCT LiAn.rrv PRACriCE (1990); UNrvERsrrY oF MISSOURI KANSAS
CfrY LAW SCHOOL, CLE MISSOURI PRODUCTS LAzm HANDBOOK (Gary C. Robb ed.,
1988-89); MICHAEL WEINBERGER, NEw YORK PRODUCTS LtABuxrr (1982); OKLAtoMA BAR
CLE, HANDLING A PRODUCT LLABnrry CASE (1988); Wn.LM POWERS, TEXAS PRODUCTS LIABIL-
rry LAW (1986).
216. We searched LAWYERS ALERT 1987-90; PERSONAL INJURY NEwsLm-rER, 1975-90; PROD-
ucrs L Bmry REP. (CCH) 1973-90; PRODUCTS LAmmrrY J. 1985-90; A.T.L.A. L. REP. 1965-90;
Toxic L. REP., 1984-90; LEADER'S PRODUCT LLABErry L. & STRATEGY.
217. We also searched court records in Miami, San Diego, and Los Angeles for punitive dam-
ages in product liability actions. Early in the research, we determined that the lack of indexing
and the storage of records in separate sites made this method generally impractical. However, we
were able to determine final disposition in some cases not located through other methods.
218. We searched MEALEY's LmGATON REPoRrER: ASBESTos and the ASBESTOS LmGATION
REPORTER, which claim to publish reports of all asbestos litigation nationwide.
219. We searched the OMNI category of NEXIS for any mention of punitive damages in
products liability during the period studied.
220. We surveyed any attorney who was listed on the record of any products cases in which
punitive damage awards were made. Telephone and personal interviews supplemented the mail-
ings. Plaintiff and defense attorneys were asked to provide us with information on any additional
punitive awards. This provided yet another check on the completeness of our sample.
221. Because there is no nationwide reporting system, some punitive damage awards were
undoubtedly missed. If there is any systematic bias, it would be that small awards would be
unreported and not located.
222. The earliest cases involved non-systematic manufacturing defects. There was a spate of
punitive damage awards against Coca-Cola in the 1940s. In 1947, an Arizona court allowed a
punitive damages claim against Coca-Cola, when the company bottled a soft drink containing
"decomposed flesh" which caused the plaintiff to become ill after ingesting it. Southwestern Coca
Cola Bottling Co. v. Northern, 177 P.2d 219 (Ariz. 1947). In a similar 1949 case, a Missouri
appeals court overturned a punitive damages award to a plaintiff who ingested a portion of a
decomposed mouse in his soft drink. Crews v. Sikeston Coca Cola Bottling Co., 225 S.W.2d 812,
815 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949). The court struck the punitive damages, observing:
[A] mouse probably got into one of its bottles and was sold to plaintiff's son in that
condition and caused plaintiff's illness later. But there is nothing in the record in this
case to show that defendant permitted the bottle of coca-cola to go out from its plant...
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the 1960s, and seventeen awards were identified between 1971 and 1975.
Awards more than doubled during the next five years and tripled between
1980 and 1985, for a total of 139 cases with punitive damages awarded.
During the most recent five-year period (1985-1990), however, the rate of
increase in the incidence of punitive damage awards slowed markedly to a
total of 151 cases. Very large punitive awards have been assessed in excep-
tional circumstances, but million dollar awards are quite unusual and suffer
a high mortality post-trial. Punitive awards of more than one million dol-
lars became very slightly more common during the 1986-1990 period, even
when inflation is taken into account, but post-trial events made such ver-
dicts increasingly difficult to collect. Table Two shows the median size of
both actual and punitive damage awards for all cases studied, as well as
those for non-asbestos cases for the twenty-five years studied.
TABLE Two
MEDIAN SIZE OF VERDICTS IN 1983 DOLLARS
Unadjusted $ N=355 (Total) N=260 (Non-asbestos)
Actual Damages $500,100 $504,623
Punitive Damages $625,000 $775,000
1983 $
Actual Damages $516,000 $551,329
Punitive Damages $688,500 $877,000
The median punitive damages award for all cases during this period is
$625,000, which exceeds the comparable actual damages median by only
$124,900.223 When the medians in Table Two are converted into constant
1983 dollars to adjust for inflation, the gap enlarges slightly to $172,500.2'
Still, this is hardly indicative of a punitive damages "crisis" in products
liability.
The authors of these punitive damage empirical studies agree that there
is no punitive damages crisis. For example, Mark Peterson, the principal
investigator in RAND's study of punitive damages, takes issue with those
who find evidence of a punitive damages problem in the research. Peterson
states that it is not even clear if punitive damage awards are increasing in
frequency at all, since "[t]he clustering . . .may bi indicative of a
in wanton disregard of the rights of plaintiff, or of any one else, and it was not liable for
punitive damages.
Crews, 225 S.W.2d at 815. Fraud and deceit in the marketing of motor oil that damaged a con-
sumer's engine led to an award of punitive damages in Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Gunn, 176 So.
332 (Ala. 1937).
223. Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages, supra note 171, at 46 tbl. 6.
224. Id.
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long-term trend, or it may be an unusual phenomenon." 2" Peterson and
co-researchers Syam Sarma and Michael Shanley assert that "punitive dam-
ages continued to be rarely assessed in personal injury cases, and most fre-
quently assessed against defendants who were found to have intentionally
harmed plaintiffs." '226
Similarly, Deborah R. Hensler, senior social scientist at RAND's Insti-
tute for Civil Justice, observes: "The furor in the business community over
punitive damage awards, considered against the backdrop of continued low
incidence in such awards, suggests to me that uncertainty about punitive
damages may lead business decision makers to overestimate the expected
value of liability exposure."227
Stephen Daniels, a principal investigator of the American Bar Founda-
tion's study of punitive damages, reports "nothing in his research so far to
support the frequently voiced notion that punitive damages have become a
menace to the equilibrium of the civil justice system."228 Daniels and his
co-investigator, Joanne Martin, conclude that "the results of this study do
not support the reformers' claims regarding patterns and changes in puni-
tive damage awards over time. Juries did not routinely award punitive dam-
ages . ..and no consistent patterns of increasing incidence over time
appeared." '229 These researchers contend that "the punitive damages debate
has become a matter of public relations, propaganda, and the mobilization
of prejudice and fear, rather than a matter of rational discourse. '230
Ironically, TXO's brief rests upon an empirical finding that West Vir-
ginia has few punitive damage awards and that those awards are proportion-
ate to actual damages.231 TXO presented empirical data showing that
punitive damage awards are modest in West Virginia.232 TXO's nation-
wide study of punitive damage awards for slander of title found only
thirty-five punitive damage verdicts affirmed on appeal.233 TXO's study of
West Virginia punitive awards in all substantive areas of the law uncovered
225. Moss, supra note 141, at 92.
226. Myrna Oliver, LA. Ranked High on Punitive Damages, L.A. Tamms, Mar. 25, 1987, at 19.
227. Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on Com-
petitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 249 (1992).
228. Fred Strasser, Have "Anecdotes," Not Facts, Fueled Tort Crisis?, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 24,
1986, at 15.
229. Daniels & Martin, supra note 168, at 61.
230. Brief of National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys at 17 n.18,
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479).
231. Petitioner's Brief at 16-17, app. a, TXO, (No. 92-479) (describing study of all West Vir-
ginia punitive damage awards affirmed on appeal).
232. Id. at 17.
233. Id. at app. b.
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no other case that had a ratio more than eleven to one.234 The highest prior
affirmed punitive award was less than one-twentieth of TXO's punitive
damages award?235
These findings did not prevent amici who wished to use the TXO case
to roll back the punitive damages remedy from claiming that the respon-
dent's "windfall" was just another example of a consistently misapplied
remedy. Because the Supreme Court's decision does not mention any of
the social science studies presented by the petitioner, respondent, and their
respective amici, it is unclear whether the Court consulted any of the empir-
ical findings in reaching its decision. Perhaps because the TXO Court was
presented with so many conflicting claims about the incidence of punitive
damages in the amici briefs, it chose not to cite any of the empirical studies
or to indicate that the studies had played any role in their deliberations.
F. The Court's Nonuse of Social Science Evidence in TXO
On June 25, 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court voted six to three to uphold
the constitutionality of the ten million dollar punitive damages award at
issue in TMO.236 Justice Stevens's plurality opinion was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun, with a partial concurrence by Jus-
tice Kennedy. The Stevens opinion rejected TXO's invitation for the Court
to "strictly scrutinize" high ratio awards as well as the respondent's asser-
tion that there need only be a rational relationship between a punitive award
and the state's interests in punishment and deterrence.237 The TXO plurality
234. Id. at app. a.
235. Id. at 17.
236. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
237. The plurality found that an award of $10 million in punitive damages, 526 times the
actual damages, did not violate TXO's due process rights. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720. The plurality
adopted a "presumptive validity" test, which is a setback for tort reformers. They relied on the
Court's statement in Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991), that a punitive
damages award four times compensatory damages "may be close to the line" of "constitutionality
impropriety" in the area of due process. Id. at 2721. TXO makes it clear that a high ratio alone
will not invalidate a punitive damages award. Post-TXO claims will focus instead on whether the
amount of punitive damages is appropriate to deter and punish the defendant's bad behavior and
on whether a reasonable relationship exists between the punitive award and the conduct being
punished. As Justice Scalia points out, 7XO will allow lower courts to dispose of "the great major-
ity of due process challenges to punitive damages awards... with the observation that '[the
punitive award] is no worse than [in] XO."' Id. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
In the wake of TXO, reviewing judges should be less willing to substitute their judgment for
that of the juries by reversing or reducing punitive damages. Five of the Justices agreed that
punitive awards are presumptively valid if there have been "meaningful constraints" upon the
fact-finder and if the punitive damages are "reasonable" in light of the functions of the remedy.
Judicial oversight currently appears to assume the opposite. In our study of punitive damage
awards in products liability cases, we found that nearly half of all awards handed down underwent
post-verdict reduction or reversal, indicating great judicial suspicion of such verdicts. Rustad, In
Defense of Punitive Damages, supra note 171, at 56-59.
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adopted an approach that presumes the validity of punitive damage awards
where "fair procedures were followed" as proscribed in Haslip.238 With the
Court's holding in TXO, the era of defendants' challenges to the constitu-
tionality of punitive damages may be drawing to a close.239
The plurality acknowledged that the Due Process Clause "imposes
substantive limits 'beyond which penalties may not go."' 240 However, it
also reiterated its declaration in Haslip that "[w]e need not, and indeed we
cannot, draw a mathematical bright light between the constitutionally ac-
ceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case."24
This approach is in accord with the traditional role of punitive damages in
deterring oppression by the powerful. It is precisely the discretion of the
fact-finder to calibrate punitive awards based on financial position, which
makes a large company hesitate before engaging in arrogant or predatory
business practices.242
Justice O'Connor's dissent, joined by Justice White in full and Justice
Souter in part, found the "monstrous award" to be "influenced unduly by
238. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
239. The next set of state and federal challenges are likely to come from plaintiffs whose
traditional rights to collect punitive damages have been curtailed by recent state legislative re-
forms. Tort reformers have been extremely successful at the state level in scaling back punitive
damages. Since the early 1980s, a majority of states have enacted one or more restrictions on
punitive damages. Rustad and Koenig, supra note 171, at 1270 n.3.
The constitutionality of reforms involving state sharing of punitive damages awards,
judge-assessed punitive amounts, and the capping of punitive damages seem particularly ripe for
future challenges. See Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., No. 1901875, 1901946, 1993 WL
222341, *17 (Ala. June 25, 1993) (holding state's $250,000 cap on punitive damages unconstitu-
tional as infringing on Alabama jury trial guarantees); Kirk v. The Denver Publishing Co., 818
P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (en bane) (striking state's sharing scheme as violating federal and state
proscriptions against the taking of private property without just compensation); State of Georgia v.
Moseley (Supreme Court of Georgia, No. $93A1 129, oral argument heard June 1993) (challeng-
ing Georgia's Compulsory Apportionment Statute, under which 75% of all collected punitive
awards go to the state treasury).
The reform of requiring the trial judge to set the amount of punitive damages has not yet
reached any appellate court. Judge-assessed punitive damages schemes seem vulnerable to chal-
lenges on the grounds of infringement of the traditional jury role and as an undue restriction on
state-guaranteed "access to justice." Thus, we predict that defendants will be spending more time
staving off challenges to already enacted state tort reforms than winning new limits on punitive
damages.
240. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2718 (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78
(1907)). The Court's decision to reaffirm the right of the states to design guidelines and of juries
to make these awards is consistent with the Rehnquist Court's judicial philosophy of deferring to
.,state autonomy."
241. Id. at 2720.
242. Because punitive damages are designed to serve the public law functions of punishment,
deterrence, and retribution, there is no compelling reason why there should be any correlation
between compensatory and punitive damages.
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TXO's out-of-state status and its large resources." 243 Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justice White, castigated the Court for its failure to formulate
objective "guidepost[s] for assessing due process" in punitive awards. 244
The dissenters argued that the increased use of this remedy "has not been
matched by a corresponding expansion of procedural protections or predict-
ability."' The dissenters believe that, in the absence of clear standards,
"the frequency and size of such [punitive] awards have been skyrocketing"
out of control? 6 Neither side cited any of the empirical studies of punitive
damage awards presented by the amici.
G. Lobbyists and Their Effect on the Judiciary Through the Use of
Social Science
Despite the unanimity of the social scientists, Justices O'Connor and
Stevens believe that there is a punitive damages crisis. Why do some mem-
bers of the judiciary believe that there is a punitive damages crisis, despite
the lack of any solid, empirical evidence? One reason is that the judiciary is
subject to a determined campaign by lobbyists to convince them that tort
reform of punitive damages is vital. The Heritage Foundation called for
influencing judicial opinions about tort law as early as 1986. It argued in its
Policy Review journal that "[w]e also need to change the attitudes of our
courts. Activist judges, not legislatures, have made most of the changes in
tort law doctrine that have produced the liability crisis. . . . Judges and
juries must recognize that civil damage awards are not a free lunch."247
The judiciary may be predisposed to accept questionable assertions in
amici briefs because they have been targeted for "reeducation" about puni-
tive damages from a variety of sources.2 48 Judges are as exposed as any
243. Id. at 2739 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 2731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 2742 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 2742 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor has not changed her opinion
about the frequency of punitive damage awards since Browning-Ferris, in which Justices
O'Connor and Stevens joining in partial dissent observed that "awards of punitive damages are
skyrocketing." Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
247. Richard K. Willard, Wheel of Fortune: Stopping Outrageous and Arbitrary Liability
Verdicts, POL'Y REv., Spring 1986, at 40, 43.
248. Tort reform lobbyists, accounting firms, and even occasional fellow judges have organ-
ized efforts to convince the judiciary of the need for tort reform of punitive damages. See, e.g.,
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOR SALE: SHORTCHANGING THE PUBLIC INTEREST FOR PRIVATE
GAIN (1993) (describing "reeducation" programs for judges and the general public sponsored by
conservative foundations and corporations); Deborah Shalowitz, Challenges to Tort Reform Pre-
dicted, Bus. INS., Jan. 25, 1988, at 57 (noting that a spokeswoman for the American Tort Reform
Association "recommended that tort reform advocates try to influence the election of a state's
judiciary, where 'good doctrine [can become] distorted"'); L. H. Otis, Risk Surge Alters Account-
ing Firms, NAT'L UNDERwRrrER, March 30, 1992, at 9, 30 ("Collectively, the accounting profes-
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other members of the public to a consistent barrage of tort reform advocacy
pieces.249
For example, Martin Connor, president of the American Tort Reform
Association and a signatory of the American Tort Reform Association
amici brief in TXO, has been particularly concerned with "educating" the
judiciary about punitive damages. He explains, 'There is no plausible ex-
planation for the dramatic rate in growth in the amount of punitive damages
against business except lawyers and judges have forgotten what the real
purpose of punitive damages is."" ° Speaking to a 1993 meeting of the
Conference of State Chief Justices, Connor argued that punitive damages
are in need of radical surgery." 1 In his speech, he summarized "three fre-
quently cited sources of empirical data' z 2 as demonstrating that punitive
damages "are being awarded in increasing numbers of cases ... [and]
astonishingly large awards are being returned against a relatively small
sion... is lobbying for tort reform, seeking to educate state and federal judges and the public
[about the impact of tort law on the profession]."); Joani Nelson-Horschler, Lobby the Courts,
State Judge Says, But Critics Balk, IND. WK., Nov. 7, 1988, at 36. One article cited West Virginia
Supreme Court Justice Richard Neeley's statement:
[A]s long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured
in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give
someone else's money away, but so is my job security, because in-state plaintiffs, their
families, and their friends will reelect me.
Nelson-Horschler, supra, at 36. Coincidentally, Justice Neeley authored the West Virginia
Supreme Court decision in the TXO case. TXO Prod. Corp v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419
S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
249. Professor Jason Johnston writes: "Increasing popular disenchantment with our current
tort system has paralleled academic criticism. Virtually no aspect of current tort doctrine has been
immune to criticism and legislative reform. However, attention has been focused on spectacular
punitive damages cases." Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in
Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1385, 1386-87 (1987).
For example, Joanne Doroshow uncovered the following examples of insurance advocacy
advertisements designed to create a popular clamoring for tort reform:
Most of us know hair-raising stories of windfall awards won in court .... Insurers,
lawyers, judges--each of us shares some blame for this mess. But it is you, the public,
who can best begin to clean it up. (1970's Aetna Advertisement). The jury smiled
when they made the award. They didn't know it was coming out of their own pockets.
You really think it's the insurance company that's paying for all those large jury awards.
Sue-icidal Impulse.... The system seems to be saying, "No matter what happens,
somebody must pay-preferably somebody rich!"
JoANN DOROSHow, Tim CASE FOR THE CrWv JURY: SAEOUARDING A PILLAR or, DnMoCrtAcY,
app. a (1992) (citations omitted).
250. Business-Related Punitive Damages Awards Increased 117 Times During Past 20 Years,
PR NEwswnm, Oct. 16, 1992 (quoting Martin Connor).
251. Martin F. Connor, The State of the Punitive Damages Debate: 1993, Address Before the
Conference of State Chief Justices (January 26, 1993), in PRODUCT SAlry & LABnrrv REP.,
February 12, 1993, at 174.
252. Id. at 176.
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number of defendants. ' '253
Connor selectively distorts or omits empirical research that does not fit
his hypothesis that tort reform is urgently needed; he cites only two of the
five empirical studies reviewed thus far," 4 the RAND Institute of Civil
Justice Study and our empirical work,"5 in support of his contention that
punitive damages are in need of radical reform 56 In so doing, Connor
demonstrates two of the common methods of slanting anici briefs: he men-
tions only the research that can be used to support his argument and quotes
from the studies in ways that distort the findings.
IV. DISTORTIONS iN SocIAL SCIENCE DATA
Here, we review a few of the techniques used by amici to create a
misperception without actually falsifying the social science findings. These
techniques were evident in the amici of all three punitive damages cases
heard by the Supreme Court. We do not want to imply, however, that selec-
tive distortion of data is only performed by tort reformers. The devices we
uncovered are widely employed by amici in the constitutional fact-finding
process. The current mechanism of amici curiae briefs encourages advo-
cates to selectively report social science findings to the Court.
A. Studies Produced by Litigating Amici
One form of junk social science is studies financed by a partisan
source, with the results presented in a manner that advances the purposes of
the funding source. The conflict of interest created by partisan funding
sources poses an inevitable problem.5 7 The Texaco punitive damages
study provides a straightforward example of this."
The Texaco study examined punitive damage awards upheld on appeal
253. Id. at 180.
254. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
255. Rusted, In Defense of Punitive Damages, supra note 171, at 26-27, 59-62.
256. Connor, supra note 251, at 176-77.
257. Empirical studies are expensive and time consuming. Government funding agencies tend
to be wary of supporting research into politically charged issues for fear that they will be punished
at budget renewal time. Our study was largely financed by Northeastern University, Suffolk Uni-
versity and the "sweat equity" of numerous law students, but seed money was also supplied by the
Roscoe Pound Foundation. The Roscoe Pound Foundation is an independent entity but has close
ties to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, an organization that filed an amicus brief for
the respondents in TXO. The Foundation describes its mission as to provide "a forum for dialogue
on law and public policy among lawyers and leaders of diverse disciplines and interest groups."
ATLA's Resources Continue to Expand, NAT'L L. August 3, 1992, at 34.
258. ST-PHEN M. TuRNE ET AL., PutmrrvE DAMAGES ExPLOsiON: FAcT OR FIcTION? (Wash-
ington Legal Foundation, Critical Legal Issues, Working Paper Series No. 50, November 1992)
[hereinafter TExAco SrTmy].
19931
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
against corporations in California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas
for the years 1988 to 1991.2 9 They compared the recent punitive damage
awards to those handed down against businesses twenty years earlier-
1968 to 1971. They found that the total amount assessed in punitive dam-
ages during the earlier period was only $1,140,000.260 During the 1988 to
1991 period, the punitive damages in business-related cases in these five
states totalled $342.9 million. 261
The Texaco study was financed and produced in-house by Texaco, Inc.
as an amicus organization, published by the Washington Legal Foundation,
another amicus group, and distributed by a third amicus filing organization,
the American Tort Reform Association. This study, prepared by Texaco
attorneys, 262 was cited by several amici in support of the petitioner.2 63
The Texaco study lumps all punitive damage awards assessed against
businesses into a single category, making it impossible to pinpoint whether
there is a problem in some particular substantive area. For example, there is
no way to determine how much of this increase is due to unique events such
as the asbestos litigation or to the growth of business-against-business civil
lawsuits. 26
The study is also slanted by its exclusive focus on "hotspots" of busi-
ness litigation: California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas.265 In
these large commercial states, which together contain thirty-six percent of
the United States population, we found 433 punitive damage awards against
business that were upheld on appeal from of 1988-1991.266 Although this is
4.7 times the number of cases from 1968-1971, it is still an average of only
108 cases per year. A 470% increase in punitive damage verdicts sounds
dramatic, but means little because there are so few cases. There is a great
percentage increase in the amount of punitive damage awards, but only a
minuscule increase in the absolute number of punitive awards.
259. Id. at A-2.
260. Id. at 4.
261. Id. at 2.
262. The first three authors of the TExAco STUDY are listed as employees of Texaco, Inc., and
the other two authors are attorneys with King & Spalding.
263. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 1,
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479) (citing Tex-
aco punitive damages study as being distributed by Washington Legal Foundation); Amicus Cu-
riae Brief of the American Automobile Manufacturers Association et al. in Support of Petitioner at
16 n.37, 17 n.40, 7XO (No. 92-479); Amicus Curiae Brief of Owens-Illinois, Inc. & Texaco Inc.
in Support of Petitioner at 4, 7XO (No. 92-479).
264. The Texaco study has not been included in tbl. 1 because it has no specific findings on
any substantive field of law, let alone product liability.
265. TExAco STU-DY, supra note 258, at 2. See RuSTA /Koma STUDY, supra note 171, at
Map One.
266. See RusrAD/Koawm, STUDY, supra note 171, at Map One.
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Texaco presented its data in a way that conceals the pattern of growth
in punitive damage awards. In contrast, all of the studies in Table I provide
information about the substantive areas in which punitive damages are
awarded. For example, our study included detailed breakdowns of the pat-
terns of awards by a large number of factors such as type of product, type of
manufacturer wrongdoing, severity of injury, gender, social class and race
of plaintiff, region, and differences between state and federal courts, so that
readers could focus on the issues which interested them.267 In contrast,
Texaco provided nothing but yearly totals, broken down by state.268 Tex-
aco's failure to publish any details beyond the total amount collected on
appeal in punitive damage cases against businesses by year makes its study
of little or no value to the Court. Until the Texaco data are presented in the
detailed fashion of the other studies, the policy implications of the Texaco
study cannot be assessed. We suspect that Texaco, the firm that was as-
sessed the largest punitive damages award ever paid, has a strong bias
against the remedy.
B. Means versus Medians
If an amici reports the mean2 69 award to describe punitive damage
awards, rather than the median,270 the figures create the impression that the
awards are large. For this reason, the petitioner's amici quote mean
amounts while respondents cite medians. When "average" (mean) award
size is reported but not the median award, there is no way to determine if
the increased size of punitive damage verdicts is the result of a pattern of
run-away juries or a small number of enormous awards like the three billion
dollars in punitive damages271 assessed against Texaco for tortiously induc-
ing Getty to breach its contract with Pennzoil. 2  For example, an amicus
brief for the petitioner cites RAND as demonstrating that "[t]he largest
punitive damages awards have increased greatly in size, sharply increasing
both the average award and the total dollars awarded." '73 In fact, the aver-
267. RusTAD, DEasYSnYnG PuNmva DAMAGEs, supra note 171, at 23-34.
268. TExAco STUy, supra note 258, at 4-15.
269. A mean value in a distribution of punitive damage awards is the "average." BLACK'S
LAW DICrIoNARY 980 (6th ed. 1990). The mean is computed by adding up all of the amounts
awarded and dividing by the number of awards.
270. The median is the "typical" amount in a distribution. Half of the awards are above the
median punitive award and half are below it. See WEBSTER'S TIrmD NEw INTERNATiONAL Dic-
TIONARY 1402 (1965).
271. The jury also awarded $7.53 billion in actual damages.
272. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1136 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1
(1987).
273. Amici Curiae Brief of Automobile Manufacturers Association in Support of Petitioner at
18 n.42, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479).
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age punitive damage award reported by RAND did increase in Cook
County from $7,000 between 1960 and 1964 to $729,000 between 1980 and
1984.274 The mean punitive award in San Francisco increased from
$166,000 to $381,000 over the same period.275 In contrast, the Cook
County median punitive damage award increased from $1,000 in the early
1960s to $43,000 in the early 1980's, while the San Francisco median
award increased from $17,000 to $63,000 in the same period.276 The me-
dian punitive award is only about one-tenth of the increase in the mean
award. As one respondent's amicus brief noted: "Critics of punitive dam-
age awards distort statistical images through the use of numerical averages.
For example, in a RAND study, the average award was $137,350, but
87.7% of the cases had awards lower than the average, with a median of
$8,800. ' '277
Daniels and Martin, the American Bar Foundation researchers, explain
the potential bias of the use of means rather than medians:
A seemingly esoteric, technical debate underlies the issue of puni-
tive damage award size generally.... It involves the appropriate
measure of central tendency to use in describing patterns and
changes in the typical award: the arithmetic mean (average) or
the median. One obtains the mean, or average, punitive damage
award by adding the amount of the awards together and dividing
by the total number of awards. The mean's disadvantage is that a
few unusually high or low figures in the data set can skew the
result upward or downward. The median punitive damage award,
on the other hand[,] is the middle figure in a sequence of awards
listed from lowest to highest. A handful of high or low numbers
in the data will not influence the median. The chosen measure is
both politically and practically significant because the two meas-
ures can give significantly different values to the typical award.
The [tort] reformers advocate the use and appropriateness of
the mean to describe patterns and changes in award size. Their
position is politically expedient because mean punitive damage
awards, as well as mean jury awards generally, are misleadingly
high.278
If there were ninety-nine awards for one dollar each and one award for three
billion dollars, the average award would be over thirty million dollars, but
that statistic would be highly misleading to anyone trying to assess the pat-
274. PErEasON ET AL., supra note 167, at 15 tbl. 2.7.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Amicus Curiae Brief of Consumer's Union in Support of Respondents, TXO, at 25-26.
(citing PE-ERSON Er AL., supra note 167).
278. Daniels & Martin, Myth and Reality, supra note 168, at 39 (footnotes omitted).
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tern of awards. Figure Two of our study, drawn from the Rustad/Koenig
study, illustrates the dramatic differences in depictions of growth rates de-
pending on whether mean or median is employed.
C. Use of Percentages Without Reporting Absolute Numbers
Our empirical study27 9 was characterized in one petitioner's brief as
demonstrating that "the frequency of punitive damages awards in product
liability cases alone mushroomed by almost 2000 percent between 1965 and
1990."28 This statement is literally true, but highly misleading. As Table
Three from our study shows, this increase was largely due to asbestos cases.
Even including the mass tort of asbestos, these verdicts account for only
about thirty awards a year nationwide-hardly the epidemic implied by the
2,000 percent figure. Graph One depicts the distorting effect of the asbestos
litigation on the rate of increase in punitive awards.
TABLE THREE
PuNrrrvE DAMAGE VERDICrs iN PRODUCrS CASES 1965-90
Years Non-Asbestos Asbestos Total Verdicts
1965-70 7 0 7
1971-75 17 0 17
1976-80 39 2 41
1981-85 119 20 139
1986-90 78 73 151
Totals 260 95 355
A number of petitioner's amici used the percentage growth in punitive
damage awards without reporting absolute numbers. An amicus brief for
the petitioner cited the RAND study as "report[ing] massive increases in
the number and size of punitive damage awards in business/contract cases,
including employment claims, between 1960 and 1984."1281 This "massive
increase" was from seventeen punitive damage verdicts in Cook County
and San Francisco County between 1960 and 1964 to 106 awards between
1980 and 1984.282
279. RusTAD, DEMYsTIF r PuNITVE DAMAGES, supra note 171.
280. Amicus Curiae Brief of Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. in Support of Petitioner
at 23, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479) (failing
to correctly cite the study's findings)..
281. Amicus Curiae Brief of Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of Petitioner,
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479) (citing PETER-
SON ET AL., supra note 167).
282. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 167, at 15 thl. 2.7.
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D. Failure to Disaggregate Data
As we have illustrated, separating asbestos punitive damage verdicts
from non-asbestos product liability actions gives a more comprehensive
picture of the pattern of awards. By failing to draw basic distinctions based
on whether the punitive damage awards were intentional torts, business
contracts or personal injury, amici in TXO create the false impression that
awards routinely victimize deep-pocketed corporations in negligence law-
suits. RAND researchers titled one of their tables of findings, "Punitive
Damages Are Infrequent, Except For Intentional Torts And Contract/Busi-
ness Cases."2 83 The amici briefs present quite a different picture of the
RAND findings.
In the petitioner's amici, juries are portrayed as assessing outrageous
punitive damage verdicts because they view the corporations as
"deep-pockets." The amicus curiae brief of the Product Liability Advisory
Council, for example, states that "juries also award more money when the
defendants are institutions or organizations rather than individuals-the
'deep-pocket' effect.... [W]e can detect a separate, statistically independ-
ent effort for deep-pocket defendants, even in cases that do not involve
products or malpractice." '284
It is hardly surprising that corporations are assessed larger awards in
personal injury cases than are individuals. Corporations can externalize
large-scale risks285 and therefore are better able to meet their liabilities. To
know whether a given punitive damage award is justified, it is necessary to
study the underlying factual foundation.28 6
283. PETERsoN Er AL., supra note 167, at 17 slide 8.
284. Amicus Curiae Brief of Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. in Support of Petitioner
at 2, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479) (citing
DEaORAH HENsLER Er AL., TRENDs IN TORT LITIGATION: Ta STORY BEHIND TmE STATISTICS 21
(1987)). Similarly, the Amicus Curiae Brief of the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. cited
the RAND punitive damages study as concluding that "[c]orporate defendants are in fact more
likely than individuals or public agencies to be the target of [punitive damages] awards" and that
"[p]unitive [damages] awards against businesses were far larger than those against individuals in
both personal injury and business/contract cases." Id. at 2 (citing PETERSON zr AL., supra note
167, at iii, 50).
285. Ideally, risks in manufacturing are born by the party in the best position to eliminate
excessive preventable danger. Because manufacturers have far more knowledge about potential
product dangers, they are in the position to "internalize" the costs of undertaking remedial meas-
ures. A company that knowingly permits consumers to face injury unnecessarily in order to save
money, is said to be "externalizing the risk" by shifting the costs outside of the firm. See gener-
ally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499, 499-534 (1961) (offering general analysis of corporate risk distribution). The "asymmetry of
information between the manufacturer and the consumer" generally means that the firm is the
lowest cost-avoider. RIcHARD A. PosNqER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 175 (4th ed. 1992).
286. The Court in TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993), sets
forth factors that may legitimately be considered in determining whether a given punitive award is
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One respondent's brief provides a more complete understanding of the
RAND report: "Punitive damages were rarely awarded in personal injury
cases and there is little evidence that frequency has increased signifi-
cantly." '287 The brief continues:
The study also found that most punitive damage awards remained
fairly modest.... The study found that punitive awards had in-
creased in cases involving business and contract torts, which the
researchers did not attribute to jury discretion, but to recent devel-
opments in insurance bad-faith law and an increasing tendency
for businesses to sue each other.288
E. Anecdotes and Bald Assertions Masquerading as Empirical Data
A petitioner's amicus in TXO claimed that, "as long as punitive dam-
age awards were relatively large and modest in amount, the system toler-
ated occasional aberrations. But the aberrations are now becoming the
standard." '2 89 The normative statement appears to have a factual founda-
tion, but, in fact, is a bald assertion. What is required is a close examination
of the aggravating circumstances of these cases to identify any "aberra-
tions" and to understand under what circumstances they occur.
In products liability, it is unusual for manufacturers to be assessed pu-
"reasonable.' Id. at 2720, 2721-22. These include the wealth of the defendant, "potential harm"
of the defendant's course of conduct, the degree of bad faith displayed by the defendant, and
whether the conduct was part of a "larger pattern of fraud, trickery and deceit." Id. at 2721-22
(citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)).
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed with these criteria but would "go further"
than the plurality, asserting that "the Constitution gives federal courts no business in this area
except to assure that due process... has been observed." Id. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). They invite reformers to seek redress in the state legislatures rather than in some
imagined "secret repository" of the Due Process Clause. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality's affirmance of the lopsided award, because it was
solidly founded upon evidence that TXO engaged in a pattern of "willful and malicious conduct."
Id. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). However, he re-
jected the plurality's interpretation of the high-ratio award as stemming from the TXO jury's
awareness of the potential harm caused by the defendant's acts. Id. at 2725-26 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy also disagreed with the
plurality's preoccupation with "reasonableness" as the basis of substantive due process review,
and argued rather, that judicial oversight should focus on whether the punitive award was a prod-
uct of juror bias or misconduct. Id. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
287. Amici Curiae Brief of Association of Trial Lawyers of America in Support of Respon-
dents at 18, TXO, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479) (citing PETERSON ET AL., supra note 167, at
65).
288. Id. at 18.
289. Amicus Curiae Brief of Phillips Petroleum in Support of Petitioner at 12, TXO, (No.
92-479).
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nitive damages without some documentary or testimonial evidence proving
inaction in the face of danger.290 In the great majority of the product cases
we studied, punitive damages were assessed only when a manufacturer
went well beyond ordinary negligence.29' The documented cost-benefit
analysis, such as was found in the Ford Pinto case, 92 or the "I don't care
attitude" displayed by the manufacturer of infant formula that removed so-
dium chloride from its product, causing retardation in babies, were typical
of the kind of corporate misconduct that evinced punitive damages. The
juries in these infant formula cases were particularly enraged when the
company asserted that it removed the salt to protect the infants from high
blood pressure.293 Another flagrant example of corporate irresponsibility
that led to punitive damages is the mass tort resulting in injuries and deaths
caused by leaking or ruptured silicone-gel breast implants. 94 Such extreme
290. Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages, supra note 171, at 66-73.
291. The fact that punitive damages are rarely awarded and not assessed for ordinary negli-
gence is hardly surprising. As Professor Richard A. Epstein has observed, "[i]n all jurisdictions
allegations of negligence have been regarded as wholly insufficient to support punitive damages.
Rather, proof of some conscious wrongdoing by the defendant has been required." RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERmiALS ON ToRTs 800 (5th ed. 1990)
292. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (App. Ct. 1981).
293. E.g., Duddleston & Sheridan v. Syntex Labs., Inc., No. 80-L-57726 (Cir. Ct. DI., Feb. 28,
1985).
294. An estimated one million women have received breast implants since they were placed
on the market in 1962. Sally Roberts, Second-generation Injuries Alleged From Breast Implants,
Bus. INs., April 5, 1993, at 3. In 1982, the FDA recommended that the silicone-gel breast im-
plants be classified as a Class II Medical Device "because the [FDA] Panel believes that this
device demonstrated a reasonably satisfactory level of performance over a long period of time."
General and Plastic Surgery Devices, 47 Fed. Reg. 2810, 2820 (1982). In 1988, the FDA reclassi-
fied the implants as Class HI devices and ruled that "commercial distribution of this device must
cease" unless the firms filed pre-market approval applications by July 9, 1991. The Food and
Drug Administration took the product off the market in January 1992, after its investigation estab-
lished the dangers of leaking or ruptured implants. The FDA has proposed tracking of any medi-
cal implants containing silicone. Medical Devices: Device Tracking, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,702, 10,707
(1992).
The companies producing breast implants concealed their knowledge of the dangers of the
implants from the FDA as well as the general public:
[A]s early as the 1960's, published medical studies and Dow's [Dow Coming Corpora-
tion] own testing had revealed the deleterious effects of silicone within the human body
and silicone's harmful tendency to migrate and to disrupt the immune system. Animal
studies reported an immune system response triggered... [autoimmune disorders] and
at least six published articles demonstrated these pathological effects. At the same time,
there were clinical reports of humans who had been injected with silicone fluid...
showing full-blown reactions attributed to silicone in people that were leading to in-
volvement of the immune system.
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp. (No. 92-16132) (9th Cir. 1993) (cita-
tions omitted).
The first punitive damages award against Dow Coming Corporation over breast implants was
handed down in 1985. Stem v. Dow Coming Corp., Nos. 85-2345 & 85-2346 (9th Cir. 1985)
($1.7 million jury verdict in favor of woman who developed silicone-induced lymphadenopathy as
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corporate misbehavior is unusual, as are the punitive damage awards in
products liability. We do not know how many "aberrations" occur in the
awarding of punitive damages in other substantive areas, but neither does
the author of the amici, who claims that arbitrary and capricious punitive
damage awards are routine.
Anecdotes masquerade as empirical fact when they are interwoven
with authoritative data, as in the example below:
While such a ten million dollars "private fine"... for an unex-
ceptional tort that caused only minimal harm seems remarkable,
there is one respect in which it is not extraordinary: as the size of
punitive damage awards has grown exponentially in recent years,
more and more of them-like the judgment in this case-have
borne no discernible relationship to the gravity of the defendant's
misconduct.295
While the RAND Study is respected social science research, Peter Huber,
the person cited in this source, makes mere assertions.296 By mixing the
two sources, the reader is misled into believing that RAND found, "no dis-
cernible relationship" between punitive awards and the defendant's miscon-
duct. This, in fact, is merely a Peter Huber assertion-not social science.
Neither the parties nor their respective amici provided the Court with
copies of any of the five studies, much less the underlying data or any ex-
planation of the methodology other than the period and counties studied.
How then are the Justices to determine whether there is a widespread puni-
tive damages problem or an increase due to new applications of the doc-
trine? In the final section, we suggest mechanisms that will allow the
Justices to better evaluate the social science data presented to them.
a result of a ruptured Dow breast implant). The evidence that breast implant manufacturers con-
cealed the dangers of implants led to a punitive damage award of $6.5 million in Hopkins v. Dow
Coming Corp., No. C88-4703 CEH, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8580 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 1992). In
Hopkins, the plaintiff argued that Dow was guilty of fraud because it had rushed development of
the implants sold to her, had specific knowledge of serious health concerns but failed to ade-
quately research these concerns; and knew that implants might cause autoimmune disease through
implant rupture or gel bleed. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, Hopkins v. Dow-Coming, Corp., 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8580 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 1992) (No. C88-4703 CEH), at 24-31. Judge Sam
Pointer of the Northern District of Alabama has been appointed to head the Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Multidistrict Litigation Panel formed to handle the flood of compensatory and punitive
claims against Dow and the other manufacturers. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products
Liability Litigation, 793 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ala. 1992).
295. Amicus Curiae Brief of American Tort Reform Association in Support of Petitioner at 4,
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479) (citing Psmm
HUBER, LiABmrry: THE LEGAL REVOLUrON AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)) (citations omitted).
296. See Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge, 21 HoFsTRA L. Rav. 183 (1992) and Joseph A.
Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L. Rv. 649 (1990), for two of many discussions of the
ways in which Peter Huber employs anecdotal methodology, sweeping generalizations and ap-
peals to emotion instead of systematic investigation in ParER Humnn, Lxzinn'y: Tam LGAL
REvOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
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V. PROPOSED SAFEGUARDS AGAINST JUNK SOCIAL SCIENCE
Social science evidence increasingly is used in a wide variety of im-
portant Supreme Court issues. 297 We applaud this trend as an alternative to
"the grab bag of informal methods of reasoning" that Richard Posner criti-
cizes as "practical reason.""29 Hunches and intuition, "authoritative misin-
formation,"2 99 are resorted to in the absence of reliable sources of
extra-legal fact.3" Justices are not immune from the human tendency to
"overvalue vivid anecdotes when making important decisions. 30 1
The Court has a continuing need for empirical evidence in its constitu-
tional fact-finding, but some new mechanism must be adopted to assist the
Justices in assessing competing claims made by partisan amici. The ex-
panded use of the amici curiae brief to represent public and private inter-
ests30 2 serves valuable functions.3 3 But the Justices need more guidance to
determine whether the amici are distorting findings, citing unreliable data or
drawing questionable normative arguments from incomplete data.3° With
social science findings, "[a]ll proffered assertions are not equal. '3 5 The
solution to this problem is to expand the role of social scientists in constitu-
tional fact-finding, not curtail it.
297. See, e.g., Ronald Roesch et al., supra note 94, at 1-5 (documenting the frequency and the
uses of social science data in anicus curiae briefs).
298. RicHARD A. PosaNi, THE PROBLEmS OF JURISPRUDENCE 455 (1990).
299. Michael J. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IowA L. Rav. 1011,
1015 (1990).
300. Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 Gno. L.J. 1355, 1357
(1991) (contending that exclusively normative judicial decision-making is inadequate in dealing
with public law remedies); see also DONALD L. HoRowrrz, Tan CouRTs Am SoCIAL Poucy 4
(1977) (describing complex policy terrain involved in judicial decision-making).
301. J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and
Psychology, 66 IN. LJ. 137, 145 (1990) (citations omitted).
302. The role of amicus curiae is particularly important in cases involving critical public law
implications. See, e.g., Michigan Prisons Case, 116 F.R.D. 655, 657 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (citing
amici participation in decision determining prisoners' rights); see also Susan Behuniak-Long,
Friendly Fire: Amici Curiae and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 74 JUDICATURE 261
(FebJMar. 1991) (discussing amici participation in judicial decision-making in abortion rights
case); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985) (citing empirical evidence provided by
amici on difficult problems of constraining violence in American schools).
303. See generally Loretta Re, The Amicus Curiae Brief. Access to the Courts For Public
Interest Associations, 14 Mm.s. U. L. REv. 522,525 (1984) (arguing that amici briefs allow public
participation in judicial decisions).
304. There are any number of ways that existing social science findings can be distorted by
lobbyists. There are also "any number of factors that might compromise the accuracy" of social
science research. It is the job of social scientists to eliminate or minimize error. Laurens Walker
& John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology or Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. Rsv. 877,
886 n.43 (1988) (citation omitted).
305. Saks, supra note 299, at 1015.
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A. Bridging the Gap Between Norms of Law and Social Science
Professional social science associations are a natural source for the
neutral expertise the Court needs to assess competing social science claims.
These organizations could be requested to file amicus curiae briefs in sup-
port of neither party to assist the Court.306 The mechanism of neutral expert
amici would be consistent with the original use of this device. Currently, it
is quite unusual for national social science professional organizations to file
amicus briefs before the Supreme Court. Only the American Psychological
Association (APA), in conjunction with the American Psychology-Law
Society, makes a practice of filing such briefs.3 07
There is a lively debate among psychologists about the proper role of
social science in amicus curiae briefs. Gerald Barrett and Scott Morris criti-
cize the American Psychological Association's amicus brief in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins..5 for violating scientific norms in advocating for
the plaintiff" because the brief presented psychological data to support the
306. The American Psychological Association (APA) sometimes submits amici curiae briefs
that support neither party. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association
in Support of Neither Party, at 2, State of Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (No. 89-478)
(noting that the "APA has participated as amicus in many cases" and that it "contributes amicus
briefs only where it has special knowledge to share with the court").
307. Our search of LEXIS located numerous amici briefs filed in Supreme Court cases from
September 1979 to May 1993 by the American Psychological Association (APA). The American
Sociological Association (ASA) had filed only one brief in the same period. Brief for Amicus
Curiae American Sociological Association in Support of Respondents, passim, Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 459 U.S. 966 (1982) (Nos. 81-2399 & 82-358)
(arguing that sociology is ideally suited to providing the Court information on social impacts).
Other major social science organizations such as the American Political Science Association and
the American Economic Association did not file any amici curiae briefs during this period.
Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file (May 1993).
A likely reason for the non-participation of these organizations is that their membership
would need to be consulted before taking a side on a controversial policy issue. Briefs filed on
behalf of neither party that would simply summarize available relevant literature within their dis-
cipline would not require membership approval. Such presentations would briefly explain a study
design, research methods and assumptions, period studied, site studied, possible biases, and gener-
alizability to the issue being litigated. Even these "neutral" briefs, however, might be slanted by
the conscious or unconscious policy goals, knowledge bases and methodological preferences of
the filers.
308. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
309. Barrett and Morris write:
[t]he avowed purpose of the APA brief was to "inform this Court of scientific thought
regarding stereotyping, particularly as it affects judgments of women in work settings."
However, the brief failed to portray accurately the scientific literature. The brief gives
the impression of a consistent body of research indicating that sex stereotypes affect
business decisions. In fact, the research on stereotyping and sex bias is inconclusive.
Although research supporting their position is provided in the brief, a large body of
contradictory research was ignored. In addition, many of the conclusions in the brief are
drawn primarily from laboratory research, with questionable generalizability to actual
work situations.
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plaintiff's claims of sex discrimination. 1° Jane Goodman defends the APA
brief,3" maintaining that social science facts do not need to be limited to
Brandeis-type legislative briefs. Social science data may also minimize
false assumptions by entering into adjudicative fact-finding. 12
Barrett and Morris believe that problems will inevitably arise because
of the conflict between the norms of science and those of law. They write:
A problem arises from a difference in the style of writing a legal
Gerald V. Barrett & Scott B. Morris, The American Psychological Association's Amicus Curiae
Brief in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: The Values of Science Versus the Values of the Law, 17
LAw & Hum. BEHAv. 201, 204 (1993) (footnote omitted).
310. Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping Re-
search in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 Am. PsYcHOL. 1049, 1053-54 (1991) (summarizing
research in APA's amicus brief).
311. Goodman writes:
This type of APA amicus brief [in Price Waterhouse] is perfectly appropriate, given the
involvement of the expert from the pretrial stage on behalf of the plaintiff. In essence,
my assessment of the APA amicus brief is precisely that it was performing its assigned
function. The position advocated by the APA brief is not so much use of psychology in
support of a particular party or a particular legal outcome, but use of psychology in
establishing elements of proof probative of legal issues that are elusive and extremely
difficult to assess, namely, the presence of impermissible discriminatory motives.
Jane Goodman, Evaluating Psychological Expertise on Question of Social Fact, The Case of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 LAw & HUM. BEAav. 249, 252 (1993).
312. Goodman explains:
Adjudicative facts are typically those facts determined at the trial level by the fact-finder
based on the oral testimony of witnesses, subject to the rules of evidence and opportu-
nity for cross-examination. The ultimate adjudicative fact, in a gender-based disparate
treatment case, such as Price Waterhouse, is whether the employer discriminated against
the plaintiff when a specific adverse employment decision was made-in this instance,
denial of promotion to partnership. Put another way, adjudicative facts are the facts of
the case that pertain to the particular parties in the litigation, derived from testimony
concerning the specific events in controversy. Adjudicative facts may be determined
from expert testimony presented at trial. The purpose of the expert testimony in Price
Waterhouse was to assist the court in determining whether Ms. Hopkins was treated
differently from male candidates for promotion in part because of her gender.
Legislative facts, by comparison, are general social facts, including products of
psychological expertise, that provide background on existing social science authority
used to guide the court in creating or modifying the content of existing law. The goal in
presenting legislative facts is to assist the court in making policy determinations that
have a bearing on individuals other than the parties engaged in the immediate case in
controversy. Legislative facts are most frequently presented to a reviewing court in a
written brief on appeal after the trial is over and the adjudicative facts have been deter-
mined by the fact-finder, although they may be presented at trial by a testifying expert
witness .... The goal of the APA brief was not to change the law or to modify legal
doctrine by citing literature summarizing research on stereotyping .... Despite the
superficial blurring of the distinction between a science translation brief and a guild
brief, there is little question that the APA's brief has more features in common with an
appellate brief submitted by advocates for one party or another than it does with a tradi-
tional, nonpartisan Brandeis brief.
Id. at 250, 252 (citation omitted).
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brief versus a scientific review. Legal briefs are designed to pres-
ent convincing arguments and evidence to support these argu-
ments. Presenting alternative evidence is the responsibility of the
opposing party. A scientific review, on the other hand, is ex-
pected to present an unbiased account of the literature and to re-
port contradictory evidence when it exists. These two distinct and
often conflicting philosophies must be combined when drafting a
brief, and often the values of the legal system predominate over
the values of science.313
Barrett and Morris charge that the APA brief writers crossed the line
between informing the court-the proper role of a science translation
brief-and advocating for a client. They argue that such advocacy under-
mines the authoritativeness of social science research.314
These psychologists propose that, to avoid the traps of advocacy, so-
cial science amicus curiae briefs should "present only conclusions from the
scientific literature and should not make judgments about disputed facts. 31
They also suggest that "amicus curiae briefs be given priority publication in
a relevant journal. 31 6 Publication in the scientific community of discourse
would allow dissenting views to be produced in time for the Court to take
notice. These mechanisms are consistent with our belief that the solution to
bias is to encourage the availability of as much social science input to the
Court.
3 17
Social science in amicus briefs can make an important contribution to
constitutional fact-finding, provided that there are safeguards against the
selective use, misuse and non-use of science data by special-interest groups.
The amicus curiae can play a key role in bringing overlooked issues to the
313. Barrett & Morris, supra note 309, at 201-02.
314. Barrett and Morris argue:
If APA forfeits its impartiality and produces briefs that are slanted in favor of one side,
it may lose its credibility as a source of scientific knowledge. If the courts do not accept
APA briefs as scientific authority, their value to society will be lost. Thus, it is of
critical importance that APA ensure the thoroughness and validity of these amicus cu-
riae briefs.... As Judge Bazelon warned, psychologists must resist the temptation to
exaggerate their psychological knowledge, because in the long run it will only reduce
their effectiveness to society and the courts.
Id. at 202 (citing David L. Bazelon, Veils, Values and Social Responsibility, 37 AM. PSYCHOL.
115-21 (1982)).
315. Id. at 211.
316. Id.
317. The authors of the APA brief, however, contest the claim that their amicus curiae brief
was slanted. They reject Barrett and Morris's suggestions for guarding against advocacy, declar-
ing that "[t]o imply that coercion is needed to guarantee objectivity is simply inaccurate and
insulting.... [I]t is an insult to imply that the brief authors purposefully misrepresented their
own work." Susan T. Fiske et al., What Constitutes a Scientific Review? A Majority Retort to
Barrett and Morris, 17 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 217, 231 (1993) (citations omitted).
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Court's attention. In Mapp v. Ohio,3 18 for example, the American Civil
Liberties Union's amicus was the only brief that raised the Fourth Amend-
ment search warrant issue that proved central to the Court's decision.319
These procedural reforms are general principles designed to raise dis-
cussion about the problems of using social science data in constitutional
advocacy. As social science becomes more commonplace in constitutional
decision-making, and as advances in statistics and computing technology
lead to increasingly complex methodologies, the Court may find itself
ill-equipped to deal with complex social scientific information. 320 After all,
few Supreme Court justices "are trained in statistics, demography, psychoa-
nalysis, cognitive psychology, or whatever the relevant social science mate-
rial may be."321
Judge Skelly Wright typifies the dilemma of a judiciary confused by
contradictory statistical evidence in a discrimination case. He castigated the
expert witnesses in one case for producing "an overgrown garden of num-
bers and charts and jargon like 'standard deviation of the variable,' 'statisti-
cal significance,' and 'Pearson product moment coefficients.' 3 2  Such
statistical terminology is commonly understood by quantitative social sci-
ences but totally foreign to those with only legal training.323 The problem
is not the result of deliberate obfuscation, but of an inevitable gap in the
training of lawyers and judges. Judges need training in social science re-
search methods so that they can assess the adequacy of the studies.324
318. 367 U.S. 643, 645-46 (1961).
319. See also Lowman, supra note 24, at 1259 n.95 ('The role played by private amiei in
providing information of the social implications of potential judicial decisions should not be un-
dervalued. Courts should not, and cannot, rely solely on information provided by governmental
sources." (citations omitted)).
320. A model rule needs to be developed that sets the ground rules for the presentation of
social science data to the Court. See Saks, supra note 299, at 1027.
321. Id. at 1026.
322. Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 859 (D.D.C. 1971).
323. The terminology employed by judges is presumably just as difficult to understand for
most social scientists.
324. Monahan and Walker argue that social science briefs should be evaluated by the relevant
scientific community in order to ensure that the studies employ valid research methods, are gener-
alizable to the problem at hand and contain findings that are consistent with other research in the
field. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15 LAv &
HuM. BEHAv. 571, 571-584 (1991).
Methodology is the set of ground rules used to evaluate whether data supports a given hy-
pothesis. Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MicH. L. REv.
1835, 1896 (1988). The external validity of a piece of social science research is its ability to
accurately measure the phenomena it purports to evaluate. See generally THOMAS R. COOK &
DONALD CAMPBELL, QuAsI-ExP uaMENATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELDS SET.
TINOs (1979); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SocIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 46-52 (1985). Pro-
fessor Sheri Johnson argues that the discomfort from the reliance upon social science data in
Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), stems from methodological questions.
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Faced with a similar problem, Judge Higginbotham called in statistical
experts to educate him about the regression equations submitted by coun-
sel.3" However, few judges have the time, the dedication or the resources
to turn their courtrooms into graduate research seminars. The Supreme
Court Justices are unlikely to attend a series of lectures on advanced statisti-
cal analysis. The following are some alternative devices that would help
the Court evaluate social science research.
B. Expanded Disclosure Requirements in Amicus Briefs
Thirty years ago, a commentator wrote that the institution of the ami-
cus brief has moved from neutrality to partisanship, "from friendship to
advocacy." '326 The changed nature of Supreme Court amicus filings re-
quires new rules that take into account the new role of social science. Pres-
ent Supreme Court rules require the disclosure of the "party supported or
[an indication of] whether it suggests affirmance or reversal."327 Amici
also are required to "state the nature of the applicant's interest."3 28 We
would require more detailed disclosures when social science is submitted
by amici.
Information should be provided to the Court about the qualifications of
the principal investigators, the funding sources for the studies, and possible
conflicts-of-interest. As Jeffrey Katzer and his colleagues note: "Since
some type of bias is possible in all studies ... [it is necessary] to identify
the major sources of bias and to judge if the bias is serious enough to war-
rant reinterpretation of the results of the study."329 Amici should be re-
quired to submit by appendix published and unpublished reports which
Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. Ry. 1611, 1704 (1985)
(noting critics' view of the inadequacy of the data used in desegregation cases).
325. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, 267-275 (N.D. Tex. 1980), modified
in part, 521 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Tex. 1981), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
326. Krislov, supra note 18, at 703, 717-18.
327. Sup. CT. R. 37(3).
328. Sup. CT. R. 37(4) ("[The] motion shall state the nature of the applicant's interest and set
forth facts or questions of law that have not been or reasons for believing that they will not be,
presented by the parties and their relevancy to the disposition of the case."). See, e.g., Brief of
Washington Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479) (noting that its interest as amicus
curiae in 7X0 was that it "regularly appears before federal and state courts promoting economic
liberty, free enterprise principles and a limited and accountable government" ). The WLF is com-
mendably honest in noting that it has "devoted substantial resources over the years through litiga-
tion and publishing to promote civil justice reform, including tort reform and opposing excessive
punitive damages." Id.
329. JEFFREY Kra= Er AL., EVALUATNG INFORMATION: A GUIDE FOR UsERs OF SOCAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH 51 (2d ed. 1982).
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describe the methodology and underlying data utilized.330  The Court
should be informed if a study was produced for the purpose of litigation
rather than for publication in a peer-reviewed professional social science
journal. All social science studies may be biased by the investigators'
methodology, theory, prejudices, or funding. These disclosure require-
ments would aid the Court in determining the validity of the studies and the
reliability of the descriptions of the findings provided in the amici briefs.
C. Judicially-Appointed Social Science Experts
United States Supreme Court Justices are well-educated individuals,
but they are not necessarily familiar with the methods of social science.
The Court has long had the power to invite amici to present information on
questions of law and fact in lower courts331 as well as in the Supreme
Court.332 However, the Court has rarely used this power, except to invite
governmental interests. Court-appointed experts in judicial deci-
sion-making have been criticized as inimical to the adversarial system pre-
cisely because of their allegiance to social science values. 333
To address these problems, professional science associations could ap-
330. This appendix should contain details of the methodology including sample selection, re-
search design, statistical technique employed, replicability, and underlying sources of data sup-
porting conclusions for all social scientific studies cited in an amidi brief.
331. The trial courts have several well-established mechanisms for receiving and evaluating
social science data. Judicial notice of social science facts is one mechanism for a court to acquire
scientific information pertinent to legal questions: "First it should be noted that a court does not
have to resort only to what is presented by the parties. The court is not restricted to evidence
adduced by the rules of evidence." Harold L. Kom, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66
CoLUM. L. REv. 1080, 1088-89 (1966). The inherent power of the court allows judges to hire
their own social science experts, just as they have the power to hire a guardian ad litem. However,
only in exceptional circumstances are funds available to do this. Without independent experts,
courts will experience difficulty interpreting social science data. The trial judge in Vuynich v.
Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1982), modified in part, 521 F. Supp. 656
(N.D. Tex. 1981), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984),
indeed complained, "Having to decide which social science expert to believe can be very frustrat-
ing to a judge with no statistical background." Id. at 258.
332. See, e.g., In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 90 F.2d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 1937) (citing
example of Supreme Court "appointing amicus curiae of its own motion").
333. Advocates would be unlikely to object to Court advisors retained to explain such techni-
cal facts as the logic of regression equations or tests of significance. However, if the social sci-
ence advisor were to have ex parte communications with the justices on policy arguments drawn
from the data, many would complain because they would have no opportunity to question the
advisor or even to hear the remarks.
Arthur F. Konopka explains this resistance to the court-appointed science experts:
[The expert] may not develop the case in the way the parties would like. Parties have a
right to develop the case, that is, agree out of court upon certain issues which they don't
want raised in court. A court-appointed expert may go after those issues because he or
she is not privy to their agreements, thus disrupting normal litigation strategies.... The
court-appointed expert is usually thought of as someone who is put on the stand and is,
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point an advisory panel of social scientists to consult with the Court when it
is faced with a difficult problem of data interpretation.33 The Court might
also consider employing an advisory panel of social scientists to render
opinions on social science questions.335 Another possible mechanism to
maximize the impartiality of the social science experts would be to have
both sides suggest experts who would in turn agree on a neutral social
scientist.
D. Social Science Special Masters
The Court could commission studies in areas where there are gaps in
the social science literature336 by submitting social science factual disputes
to a specialized social science court paralleling specialized courts such as
the Court of Customs or Court of Patent Appeals. Furthermore, a special
master could receive briefs, hold oral arguments, and make findings of fact
to the Court on specific social science questions.
The Court's authority would be unimpeded by a special master be-
cause it is free to reject the social science special master's findings or to
resubmit the issue for further research. These special masters could
be drawn from a pool of academic experts in research methods and
therefore, available for cross-examination by the parties, so the role is, at least, less
onerous to the bar than that of the court advisor.
Arthur F. Konopka et al., Applied Social Research as Evidence in Litigation, in THm Usa,
NoN-UsE AND ABUSE OF SociAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE i LmGATON supra note 105, at 129, 130.
Problems might also arise based on the methodological or personal preferences of the
Court-appointed expert. For example, the Court could choose a methodologist completely enam-
ored with tests of significance who might totally dismiss a social network analysis. STEPnEN 0.
BERKowrrz, AN INRMODUCTON TO STRucruRAL AsALYsLs 64-70 (1982).
334. Social science experts could provide the Court with advisory opinions on the adequacy of
the methodology, explain the extent to which empirical findings have been replicated, and provide
data analysis and interpretation to the Court. Monahan & Walker, supra note 4, at 490 (arguing
that the value of social science depends upon replication). Given the justices' educational back-
ground, there is no necessity to adopt a test barring social science evidence not meeting a "general
acceptance" standard.
335. The trial courts already have a functional equivalent to this mechanism under Rule 39(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that in all non-jury actions, the court may
try any issue before an advisory jury. FED. R. Crv. P. 39(c). Konopka notes that the advisory jury
has fallen into disuse since World War II, yet Rule 39(c) permits them. Konopka et al., supra note
333, at 134.
336. For instance, many courts have adopted rules forbidding the confrontation of the defend-
ant with alleged victims of child sexual abuse. Yet these policies are not supported by systematic
empirical study. There is little extant research on the question of whether a defendant's
face-to-face confrontation with child victims of sexual abuse has any more negative psychological
effects than such confrontations has for adult victims. Brief of the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at xiv, Commonwealth of Ky. v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (No. 86-572).
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statistical analysis.337 Special masters could be selected by professional
associations from among scholars on sabbatical or on temporary loan from
their institutions. 331
337. Another possibility is that the social science masters could be drawn from social scien-
tists who have an expertise in law. However, these judges would be less capable of ascertaining
the legal relevance of empirical data in constitutional fact-finding, legal relevance, and materiality
concerns. See generally John W. Osborne, Judicial/Technical Assessment of Novel Scientific Evi-
dence, 1990 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 497 (1990) (arguing that "science court" judges require some under-
standing of evidentiary and judicial concerns).
338. Special masters would parallel the proposed Science Courts in that they would bring
specialized knowledge to deciding social science questions. The social science special master
could employ similar procedures as other appellate panels, within the narrow confines of a social
scientific controversy. See, e.g., Arthur Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment, TmiAL, Mar.
1977, at 48; Richard E. Talbott, 'Science Court': A Possible Way to Obtain Scientific Certainty
for Decisions Based on Scientific 'Fact', 8 ENvTL. L. 827 (1978). Ideally, social science judges
would have a doctorate in a social science field as well as legal training. There are several joint
Ph.D/J.D. programs from which such individuals could be drawn. Joint Ph.DJJ.D. programs pres-
ently in operation include Northwestern University, State University of New York at Buffalo,
University of California at Berkeley and the University of Wisconsin. Northeastern University's
Law, Policy and Society Ph.D program also graduates substantial numbers of individuals with J.D.
degrees and doctorates in social science disciplines.
Individuals with a joint Ph.D/J.D. also could be drawn from the existing ranks of the more
than 1,000 sitting judges. If individuals with these talents exist, there needs to be some mecha-
nism for temporary assignments on the social science court. Thejudicial panel would then consist
of judges trained in the social sciences, with a heavy emphasis on methodological issues.
There is a question whether social science special masters should be career judges or sit
temporarily to consider a question within their area of expertise. The advantage of career masters
would be continuity, socialization into the role, and a greater understanding of how to resolve law
and policy issues. Careerjudges also would be free from potential conflicts of interest, such as the
desire to render a positive decision in exchange for future employment, research funding or other
potential gains.
On the other hand, temporary social science masters would provide more flexibility in select-
ing judges with specialized knowledge in a given area. Universities generally would be superior
to industry as a source of social scientific judicial talent because college faculty have the protec-
tion of academic freedom and are trained in the norms of science. University professors also tend
to be less narrowly specialized than industrial experts. However, extreme care would be needed in
the selection of these special masters since academics too may have ideological blinders, be en-
gaged in rivalries, or have a potential financial stake in the outcome.
Social science judicial conferences could be held to train new special masters in the uses of
social science data in the courts. Social science special master panels could convene regularly to
keep abreast of the latest social scientific methodologies, controversies, and other developments.
The advantage of masters with joint graduate degrees in social science and law would be the
relative efficiency of learning about new techniques.
A major question would be how a social scientific review of a given controversy would be
triggered. The masters should have the power sua sponte to submit given findings to the Court
that it might not be aware of in a given case. Either of the parties should have the option of
petitioning the Court for a hearing before a special social science master on a given constitutional
issue involving social scientific methodologies or data.
The social science court could also accept jurisdiction from lower state and federal trial
courts for review of social scientific facts and methodology. The panel members would behave as
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E. National Institute of Law, Policy and Social Science
Another method of assisting the judiciary in interpreting social science
data would be to create a research agency specifically devoted to law and
policy issues that require extra-legal investigations.339 One mission of the
new agency would be to parallel the Justice Department's Bureau of Statis-
tics by collecting systematic data on the civil justice system on a continuing
basis.340 Already existing research organizations such as the National
Center for State Courts or the Federal Judiciary Center could be expanded
to perform these new tasks.
Kenneth Culp Davis contends that the Court continually needs to con-
sult studies of legislative facts. While amici briefs are desirable, he argues
that a professional research service for the Court is a necessary reform.341
The advantage of an independent agency or research service is that the
Court will have an independent professional judgment to assist its
inquiry.342
A National Institute of Law, Policy and the Social Sciences would be
the ideal mechanism through which to provide the courts with social sci-
ence information. This Institute could have a permanent staff of social
scientists trained in law and statistics to provide research support to the
judiciary.
VI. CONCLUSION
The alternative to admitting social science data is to return to nine-
any other appellate panel. The social science judges would consider briefs, hear oral arguments,
and render judicial opinions on the specific social scientific data or method.
339. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis argues that the U.S. Supreme Court needs a research arm.
He suggests that the Court should either have its own research body or be permitted to access the
Congressional Research Service. Jim Schachter, High Court Needs Research Arm, Scholar Says,
L.A. Tuvms, May 1, 1987, at 2:1.
340. Researchers on Tort Law's Effects To Seek Common Ground, LxABan=y WK., Nov. 16,
1992, at 43 (proposing new entity including University of Wisconsin Law Professor Marc Ga-
lanter, RAND senior researcher Deborah Hensler, as well as representatives of the National Center
for State Courts, the American Bar Foundation, and the American Judicature Society).
341. Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed
Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MiNN. L. REv. 1 (1986).
342. Davis argues that the Court often will be tackling what he calls "legislative facts." He
defines legislative facts: "When an agency [or court] wrestles with a question of law or policy, it
is acting legislatively.... [t]he facts which inform its legislative judgment may conveniently be
denominated legislative facts." Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, supra note 124, at 402.
The Federal Rules of Evidence have adopted Davis's concept in Rule 201, "Judicial Notice
of Adjudicative Facts," which distinguishes between legislative (policy) and adjudicative (be-
tween the immediate parties) facts. FED. R. Evrn. 201. See generaly STamm SALrmuRo &
KENNEm REDDEN, FEDERAL RULEs OF EviDENCE MANUAL 59 (4th ed. 1986) (offering commen-
tary upon the Rules).
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teenth century legal formalism, according to which justices or other power-
ful groups substitute their own normative beliefs for scientific findings.
Korematsu v. United States343 illustrates the hazard of exclusive reliance on
abstract doctrinal reasoning. There, the Court sanctioned a civilian exclu-
sion order requiring the wholesale removal of Japanese-Americans from the
west coast. The Court's decision was based on the government's untested
assertion that substantial numbers of Japanese-Americans were likely to en-
gage in treasonous activities.3" Even famous civil libertarians like Justice
Hugo Black accepted the claim of Japanese-American disloyalty without a
scintilla of social scientific data.34 Justice Murphy dissented from the ma-
jority opinion, arguing that the removal order was based upon "misinforma-
tion, half-truths and insinuations. 3 46
Third-party amici providing social science data can be an important
check against governmental abuse of power. Sociological surveys, focus
groups, anthropological studies, or any accepted empirical research would
have shown the questionable grounds for the Court's decision in
Korematsu.347
The problem of integrating social science research into constitutional
decision-making is "complicated by the fact that not all social science is
created equal."3 48 Social science evidence has a continuing vitality in the
Court's constitutional fact-finding.349 We should not deny the Court parti-
san information, but we should provide it with an independent mechanism
to evaluate competing claims. If the Court is to use empirical studies to
accurately reflect social reality, it needs additional safeguards. Lobbyists
serve a useful purpose. Nevertheless, they should not have unrestricted
power to shape the Justices' perception of the social science literature.
343. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
344. Id. at 218-19.
345. Id. at 223. Justice Black writes, "We cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose
number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained." Id. at 218 (citing H-iraba-
yashi v. United States, 330 U.S. 81, 99 (1943)); see also Brief of the American Civil Liberties
Union et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, United States of America, U.S. v. Wil-
liam Honri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987) (No. 86-510) (arguing that the United States government con-
cealed from the Court the fact that it considered the reports of Japanese-American cooperation
with the enemy to be unreliable).
346. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
347. See generally RosEN, supra note 69, at 127 (arguing that the Korematsu decision sug-
gested "that the Court was willing to act on an unproven 'sociological' judgment, even though the
supporting evidence was far from unimpeachable").
348. Faigman, supra note 120, at 1079.
349. Faigman argues that the continuing "relevance of the social sciences to judicial decision-
making depends on their [social scientists] capacity to inform legal decisionmakers of factual
questions concerning human behavior." Id. at 1095.
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